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DEPOLITICIZING JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY
RULEMAKING
Scott A. Keller*
Abstract: Administrative law doctrines for reviewing agency rulemaking, such as the
Supreme Court’s dicta in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co.1 and the D.C. Circuit’s hard look doctrine, give judges significant
discretion to invalidate agency rules. Many commentators recognize that this discretion
politicizes judicial review of agency rulemaking, as judges appointed by a president of one
political party are more likely to invalidate agency rules promulgated under the presidential
administration of a different political party. Unelected judges, though, should not be able to
use indeterminate administrative law doctrines to invalidate agency rules on the basis that
they disagree with the policy decisions of a presidential administration.
This Article argues that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in FCC v. Fox Television
Stations, Inc.2 implicitly eliminated State Farm’s dicta and the D.C. Circuit’s hard look
doctrine. In place of these paternalistic doctrines, courts should establish a doctrine for
reviewing agency rulemaking that examines only the agency’s purpose in regulating and the
means used by the agency to achieve that purpose—instead of giving courts leeway to
impose additional procedures on agencies and to nitpick rulemaking records. Constitutional
doctrines for reviewing legislation already focus on a government actor’s purpose and means,
so these doctrines should also be used for reviewing agency rules, which are legislative-like
pronouncements that are binding with the force of law.
Ultimately, this Article proposes that courts should review agency rulemaking under the
standard for reviewing legislation known as “rational basis with bite.” Rational basis with
bite would require the agency, at the time it promulgates a rule, to articulate its actual
statutory purpose in promulgating the rule and explain how the rule is rationally related to
that purpose. Not only would rational basis with bite significantly limit the ability of judges
to invalidate agency rules based on policy disagreements, but the standard fits well with the
Supreme Court’s precedents on APA arbitrary and capricious review.
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INTRODUCTION
The Obama Administration’s largest impact on federal policy may
very well come from institutions that are not usually on the public’s
radar screen: administrative agencies. Federal agencies create a
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substantial majority of the country’s new laws,3 and “[t]here is going to
be a huge amount of action in the regulatory arena after years of
deregulation under President Bush.”4 Weeks into office, President
Obama directed the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to
reconsider two Bush Administration decisions: (1) preventing states
from setting auto emission and fuel efficiency standards that are more
stringent than federal standards,5 and (2) adopting less stringent controls
on mercury pollution from power plants.6 Similarly, as soon as President
Obama took office, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved
“the world’s first test in people of a therapy derived from human
embryonic stem cells”—a clinical trial that had been rejected by the
Bush Administration.7 Moreover, the Obama Administration’s Interior
Department reversed the Bush Administration’s plan to allow offshore
oil drilling.8 Some also believe that the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) under the Obama Administration could reinstitute
the controversial “fairness doctrine.”9
The Bush Administration anticipated that the Obama Administration
would overhaul the country’s administrative regulations, so in the final
months of President Bush’s tenure, his Administration took a series of
administrative actions to deregulate various consumer and

3. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 985–86 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) (“[T]he sheer amount
of law . . . made by [administrative] agencies has far outnumbered the lawmaking engaged in by
Congress through the traditional process.”).
4. Brian C. Mooney, Harvard’s Sunstein to Oversee Regulation, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 9, 2009, at
A12 (quoting Jeffrey Rosen).
5. John M. Broder & Peter Baker, Obama’s Order Likely to Tighten Auto Standards, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 26, 2009, at A1.
6. Tom Goldstein, EPA Moves to Dismiss Clean Air Act Case, Reversing Bush Administration
Policies, SCOTUSBLOG.COM, Feb. 6, 2009, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/epa-moves-to-dismissclean-air-act-case-reversing-bush-administration-policies/.
7. Andrew Pollack, Milestone In Research In Stem Cells, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2009, at B1.
8. Bush-Era Offshore Drilling Plan Is Set Aside, MSNBC.COM, Feb. 10, 2009,
http://www.msnbc.com/id/29119940.
9. See John Eggerton, Citing Obama Opposition, McDowell Warns Against Fairness Doctrine,
MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Jan. 28, 2009, http://www.multichannel.com/article/print/162933Citing_Obama_Opposition_McDowell_Warns_Against_Fairness_Doctrine.php; George F. Will,
Broadcast ‘Fairness’ Fouls Out, WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 2008, at B7; see generally Red Lion Broad.
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 369 (1969) (“The Federal Communications Commission has for many
years imposed on radio and television broadcasters the requirement that discussion of public issues
be presented on broadcast stations, and that each side of those issues must be given fair coverage.
This is known as the fairness doctrine . . . .”).
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environmental industries.10 Most would assume that the administrative
actions of an outgoing president could be overturned by an incoming
presidential administration that wants to reverse course on federal
regulatory policy. After all, the electorate holds presidents accountable
for their actions, and presidential administrations react to the public’s
perception of the administration’s regulatory policies.11
But administrative law doctrines for judicial review of agency
rulemaking have become a “judicially created obstacle course”12 that
gives judges far too much leeway to reach results based on their partisan
policy preferences.13 This, in turn, allows unelected judges to prevent
10. See R. Jeffrey Smith, A Last Push to Deregulate, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 2008, at A1 (“The
White House is working to enact a wide array of federal regulations, many of which would weaken
government rules aimed at protecting consumers and the environment, before President Bush leaves
office in January.”); see also Note, The Mysteries of the Congressional Review Act, 122 HARV. L.
REV. 2162, 2162 (2009) (“And as President Bush’s term came to an end, his staff took steps widely
viewed as intended to ensure the Obama Administration would have a more difficult time undoing
Bush’s rules than the Bush Administration had undoing Clinton’s eight years earlier. The pattern is
familiar, dating to the first hostile presidential transition from John Adams to Thomas Jefferson.”
(footnotes omitted)).
11. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2337 (2001) (“The
Presidency is by nature a public institution, and almost no presidential exercise of authority,
however masked or oblique, long can escape public notice; this scrutiny then will bring to bear on
the President the pressures associated with a national constituency.”).
12. Am. Radio Relay League, Inc. v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 248 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
13. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2006) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, ARE JUDGES POLITICAL?] (providing
statistical analyses of judicial voting behavior); Frank B. Cross, Shattering the Fragile Case for
Judicial Review of Rulemaking, 85 VA. L. REV. 1243, 1270–74 (1999) (discussing the “evidence of
judicial ideological decisionmaking” in administrative law); Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller,
Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of
Appeal, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2168–69 (1998) (noting that D.C. Circuit panels controlled by judges
appointed by Republican presidents reached conservative decisions in 54% of cases, and panels
controlled by Democratic appointees reached liberal decisions in 68% of cases); Thomas J. Miles &
Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 807 (2008)
[hereinafter Miles & Sunstein, Arbitrariness Review] (recognizing, under the arbitrary and
capricious review standard, that “judicial policy preferences do play a significant role, and in the
difficult cases, it does seem to be driving actual outcomes”); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein,
Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV.
823, 827 (2006) (“[T]he application of the Chevron framework . . . shows a significant effect from
the political convictions of federal judges.”); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Two Problems in Administrative
Law: Political Polarity on the District of Columbia Circuit and Judicial Deterrence of Agency
Rulemaking, 1988 DUKE L.J. 300 (1988); Richard Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and
the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717 (1997). See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Does Red Lion Still
Roar? Keynote Address, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 767, 769–70 (2008) (discussing the statistical analyses
of judicial voting behavior reported in SUNSTEIN, ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? and noting that “[t]here
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many shifts in regulatory policy favored by an incoming president.
President Bush therefore could have expected that his final deregulatory
acts would “be difficult for his successor to undo.”14
Of course, this is nothing new for modern presidential
administrations. President Reagan campaigned on a major shift in
federal regulatory policy,15 but the deregulatory changes his Republican
administration enacted were met with staunch resistance by the courts—
which were freshly packed with judges appointed by Democratic
President Carter.16 Indeed, the administrative law doctrines adopted in
the late 1970s and early 1980s allowed judges to use their policy
preferences to invalidate agency action.17 These doctrines are still used
today, and they could prevent the Obama Administration from shifting
regulatory policy as President Obama has promised.18 Like President
Reagan, President Obama will have to get his regulatory changes
through courts that are full of judges who were appointed by his
predecessor.19
It would be a mistake, however, for judges to continue using
indeterminate administrative law doctrines to invalidate agency rules on
the basis that they disagree with the policy decisions of a presidential
administration.20 This argument does not turn on the prudence of the
is a statistically significant difference between the overall liberal voting rate of Democratic and
Republican appointees”).
14. Smith, supra note 10, at A1.
15. See Abner J. Mikva, Deregulating Through the Back Door: The Hard Way to Fight a
Revolution, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 521, 527 (1990) (“Carter’s successor, Ronald Reagan, had been
campaigning for years against big government and bureaucratic excess and entered office pledged to
strong, swift action against ‘overregulation.’” (quoting MARTHA DERTHICK & PAUL J. QUIRK, THE
POLITICS OF DEREGULATION 29–30 (Brookings Institution, 1985))).
16. See, e.g., Michael D. Schattman, Picking Federal Judges: A Mysterious Alchemy, 96 MICH. L.
REV. 1578, 1593 (1998) (noting that during President Carter’s tenure, Congress created 117 new
federal trial judges and 35 new federal appellate judges).
17. See supra note 13.
18. See supra notes 3–9 and accompanying text.
19. See Eric A. Posner, Does Political Bias in the Judiciary Matter?: Implications of Judicial
Bias Studies for Legal and Constitutional Reform, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 853, 866 (2008) (“[F]or
judges with lifetime tenure, at any given time their policy preferences may well lag behind those of
the public and of existing parties.”).
20. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984)
(“Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political branch of the Government.
Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing political interests, but not on the basis of the
judges’ personal policy preferences. In contrast, an agency to which Congress has delegated
policymaking responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the
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Obama Administration’s policies; rather, it is driven by the
Constitution’s requirement for the separation of powers and the need to
respect institutional competence. The courts can just as easily invalidate
the agency rulemaking of a Democratic President as a Republican
President. For example, even in President Bush’s final year of office,
courts struck down his administration’s regulations related to global
warming and to the broadcast of indecent material.21 Quite simply,
administrative law doctrines need to be modified to prevent unelected
judges from using their policy preferences to invalidate agency
rulemaking.
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in FCC v. Fox Television
Stations, Inc.22 may be the watershed precedent that charts a new course
for administrative law. The doctrinal culprits that have allowed judges to
use their policy preferences to invalidate agency rulemaking are the
Supreme Court’s dicta on the Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA)
arbitrary and capricious standard of review in Motor Vehicle
Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.23
and the D.C. Circuit’s hard look doctrine. While Fox Television did not
explicitly reject the State Farm dicta and the hard look doctrine, the way
Fox Television engaged in APA arbitrary and capricious review
implicitly rejected both.
Consequently, after Fox Television, courts should replace State
Farm’s dicta and the hard look doctrine with a doctrine for reviewing
agency rulemaking that examines the agency’s purpose in regulating and
the means used by the agency to achieve that purpose—instead of
requiring the agency to use additional procedures and scouring the
rulemaking record to make up insignificant problems with that record.
Constitutional doctrines for reviewing legislation already focus on the
purpose and means of a governmental actor.24 By tying review of agency
rulemaking to the doctrines for reviewing legislation, courts could
provide a limiting principle to justify their review of agency rulemaking.
incumbent administration’s views of wise policy to inform its judgments.”).
21. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. NHTSA, 538 F.3d 1172, 1182 (9th Cir. 2008) (striking
down Bush Administration fuel emissions standards on the basis of global warming); CBS Corp. v.
FCC, 535 F.3d 167, 171 (3d Cir. 2008), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 2176 (2009) (invalidating the Bush
Administration’s rule that penalized the broadcast of indecent material).
22. 556 U.S. __ (Apr. 28, 2009), 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009).
23. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
24. See infra notes 223–232 and accompanying text.
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This limiting principle would also recognize that precedents on
reviewing legislation from the past century have used trial and error to
find the most effective doctrines for reviewing legislative-like
pronouncements, such as agency rules. Moreover, this shift would
coincide with the modern Court’s insistence that the APA be interpreted
as it was understood when Congress enacted it in 1946.25
Ultimately, this Article proposes that courts should review agency
rulemaking under the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard, 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(A), according to the standard for reviewing legislation that has
become known as “rational basis with bite.”26 This is the standard that
emerges from Fox Television.27 Rational basis with bite would require
the agency, at the time it promulgates a rule, to articulate its actual
statutory purpose in promulgating the rule and explain how the rule is
rationally related to that purpose.28 This should not be a heavy burden on
agencies as the APA already requires them to provide a “concise general
statement of [the rule’s] basis and purpose.”29 Courts therefore would
not be permitted to come up with hypothetical purposes or explanations
to justify the agency’s rule, as courts are allowed to do under traditional
rational basis review (known also as “minimum rationality review”). Not
only would rational basis with bite significantly reduce the ability of
judges to veto agency rules based on policy disagreements, but the
Supreme Court’s precedents on APA arbitrary and capricious review fit
quite well with the rational basis with bite doctrine.
Rational basis with bite is also preferable to the other standards used
in reviewing legislation. To eliminate the chances of judges using their
policy preferences in reviewing agency rulemaking, some might be
tempted to adopt minimum rationality review, the traditional rational

25. See infra note 268 and accompanying text.
26. This Article focuses on agency informal (notice-and-comment) rulemaking. See 5 U.S.C. §
553 (2006). The APA’s arbitrary and capricious review standard applies when courts review agency
informal rulemaking. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). The arbitrary and capricious standard, though, also
applies when courts review other forms of agency action, such as informal adjudication. See, e.g.,
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971). It could be prudent for
courts to use the same rational basis with bite standard in reviewing those other forms of agency
action under APA arbitrary and capricious review. This Article, however, does not address this issue
because part of the rationale for proposing the rational basis with bite standard is the connection
between agency rulemaking and legislation. See infra Part I.A.
27. See infra notes 201–203, 296–297 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 67–71, 235–238 and accompanying text.
29. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c).
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basis test for reviewing most legislation—which is extremely
deferential.30 However, there are strong reasons for using a heightened
standard for review of agency rulemaking as compared to review of
legislation: Agencies are comprised of unelected officials and are not
required to use the rigorous procedures that the Constitution requires of
Congress, and the Supreme Court underenforces the nondelegation
doctrine.31 At the same time, intermediate or strict scrutiny would only
make it easier for judges to use their policy preferences to invalidate
agency rules, because those doctrines give judges much more latitude to
do so than does rational basis with bite.32 Rational basis with bite
drastically reduces the ability of judges to infuse their policy preferences
into review of agency rulemaking, but still subjects agency rules to a
heightened standard of review compared to review of most legislation.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I traces the Supreme Court’s
evolving doctrine for reviewing agency rulemaking by comparing how
the Court’s changing doctrine for reviewing agency rulemaking differs
from the Court’s doctrines for reviewing legislation. In hindsight, this
may seem like an obvious way to evaluate the doctrine for reviewing
agency rulemaking, but no court or commentator has written of the link
between these doctrines. Part I thus also shows how judges got into the
business of invalidating agency rules on the basis of policy
disagreements in the first place, and it explains how the Supreme Court
left lower courts with little guidance on how to review agency
rulemaking until Fox Television was recently decided. This allowed the
D.C. Circuit—the federal court that reviews most agency rulemaking—
to invalidate a significant number of agency rules under its hard look
doctrine.
Part II argues that doctrines for judicial review of legislation should
be used in creating doctrines for judicial review of agency rulemaking,
because this will shift the focus back to reviewing an agency’s purpose
in regulating and the means used to further that purpose. Unelected
judges have been overruling the substantive policy decisions made by
expert agencies because courts in the 1970s and 1980s began divorcing
doctrines for reviewing agency rulemaking from doctrines for reviewing
legislation. Without any theoretical limitations on judicial review of

30. See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 52–67 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 279–280 and accompanying text.
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agency rulemaking, arbitrary and capricious review under the APA
before Fox Television had essentially become a mechanism for courts to
veto agency rulemaking.
Part III then proposes that the rational basis with bite doctrine be used
for APA arbitrary and capricious review of agency rulemaking. This Part
concludes by applying rational basis with bite review to two recent court
of appeals cases to show how the doctrine fits with existing Supreme
Court precedent and can prevent judges from using their policy
preferences to uphold or invalidate agency rulemaking.
The arguments in Parts II and III are conceptually distinct: One could
accept that doctrines for reviewing legislation should be used in creating
doctrines for reviewing agency rulemaking (agreeing with Part II), while
arguing that a level of scrutiny other than rational basis with bite should
be used in reviewing agency rulemaking (disagreeing with Part III). This
distinction is important because neither courts nor commentators have
suggested that the doctrines for reviewing agency rulemaking should be
based on the doctrines for reviewing legislation. Thus, even if there is
disagreement over this Article’s ultimate proposal that the rational basis
with bite doctrine should be used in reviewing agency rulemaking, the
decades-long debate regarding the justifications and doctrines for
judicial review of agency rulemaking would be greatly clarified by
tethering the doctrines for reviewing agency rulemaking to the doctrines
for reviewing legislation.
I.

THE SUPREME COURT’S EVOLVING DOCTRINE FOR
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY RULEMAKING

The courts have gone through various phases in reviewing agency
rulemaking. Most accounts of these phases focus on the different
degrees of faith that judges have had in administrative agencies, without
examining the underlying doctrinal shifts.33 This Part makes that
33. The typical account of the changes in deference to agencies goes something like this: Courts
gave broad deference to agencies immediately after President Roosevelt’s New Deal in 1930s;
courts retracted the deference accorded to agencies by the 1970s when courts became skeptical that
agencies had been captured by the regulated industries; and, while that 1970s view largely holds
true today, some modern courts have re-expanded the deference to agencies based on a textualist
view that the APA should be interpreted as it was understood when it was enacted in 1946. See
generally Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189,
1191–94, 1207, 1224, 1252–53, 1264–67, 1286–95, 1308–09, 1315–18, 1325–26 (1986), as
reprinted in PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN AND BYSE’S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 13–23 (10th
ed. 2003).
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examination by comparing the Supreme Court’s evolving doctrines for
judicial review of agency rulemaking with its doctrines for judicial
review of legislation. This novel analysis provides a more complete
picture of why courts began according agency rulemaking less deference
and how judicial review of agency rulemaking has become so
politicized.
As the rest of Part I will show, the Supreme Court at first treated
agency rulemaking exactly the same as it treated legislation. Soon,
though, the Court recognized the differences between agency rules and
legislation, and started subjecting agency rulemaking to a slightly higher
standard of review. By the 1970s, the D.C. Circuit became extremely
wary that administrative agencies had been captured by the industries
they regulated. It therefore created the hard look doctrine, which gave
courts the power to invalidate agency rulemaking for a whole host of
reasons—for example, because the agency did not afford interested
parties enough procedure or the agency did not sufficiently analyze
alternatives. The Supreme Court’s reaction to the D.C. Circuit’s hard
look doctrine was anything but a model of clarity, and it left the doctrine
for reviewing agency rulemaking in shambles. Indeed, administrative
law textbooks today still ponder how the Court’s three major arbitrary
and capricious review cases—Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,34 Motor Vehicle
Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,35
and Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.36—

34. 435 U.S. 519 (1978). See Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV.
L. REV. 505, 529 (1985) (explaining that Vermont Yankee was limited to rejecting procedural hard
look); Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978
SUP. CT. REV. 345, 356 (1978) (noting that Vermont Yankee was decided on the basis of
“inadequacy of procedures” and not “inadequacy of record support”); Matthew Warren, Note,
Active Judging: Judicial Philosophy and the Development of the Hard Look Doctrine in the D.C.
Circuit, 90 GEO. L.J. 2599, 2631 (2002) (stating that Vermont Yankee rejected procedural hard
look).
35. 463 U.S. 29 (1983). See, e.g., Garland, supra note 34, at 543 (“On one level, the State Farm
decision is a ringing endorsement of the quasi-procedural hard look.”); id. at 545 (recognizing that
both elements of the substantive hard look—scrutiny of the agency’s record and a heightened
standard of review going beyond minimum rationality—appeared in State Farm); Kagan, supra note
11, at 2372 (explaining that courts regularly review “agencies’ decisionmaking processes under the
‘hard look’ standard exemplified in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n of the United States v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.”); Warren, supra note 34, 2631 (“[T]he Supreme Court
finally used the substantive hard look standard to overturn an agency action in [State Farm].”).
36. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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fit together, and those cases were all decided at least twenty-five years
ago.37 However, the Court’s recent decision in FCC v. Fox Television
Stations, Inc. significantly limits the ability of judges to invalidate
agency action. This Article argues that Fox Television implicitly rejected
the D.C. Circuit’s hard look doctrine and eliminated the criteria for
overturning agency action listed in dicta in State Farm.
A.

Equating Agency Rulemaking with Legislation

Because the Supreme Court has essentially abandoned the
nondelegation doctrine, agencies are permitted to make rules that
generally function as if they were statutes enacted by Congress itself.
According to the nondelegation doctrine, “Congress may not
constitutionally delegate its legislative power to another branch of
Government.”38 The Court, however, has interpreted the nondelegation
doctrine such that it virtually never prevents Congress from delegating
legislative power to agencies.39 Consequently, Congress can delegate
“authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of
law,”40 and agency rules that are binding with the force of law basically
function as congressional legislation. So when an agency promulgates a
rule that is binding with the force of law (for example, through informal
rulemaking—which is also known as notice-and-comment rulemaking),
it is acting as a proxy for Congress in the lawmaking process.41
It would therefore make sense to develop doctrines for judicial review
of agency rulemaking with regard to the doctrines developed for judicial
review of legislation, as both deal with review of legislative-like
37. See STRAUSS ET AL., supra note 33, at 989 (leaving open the question of “[w]hat analytical
pattern” Overton Park, State Farm, and Chevron “exhibit”).
38. Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 165 (1991); see also Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark,
143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892) (“That Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the President is a
principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of
government ordained by the Constitution.”).
39. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472–76 (2001) (noting that the
nondelegation doctrine requires Congress to provide agencies with an intelligible principle, and that
such intelligible principles require very little specificity).
40. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001).
41. See id. at 230 (“It is fair to assume generally that Congress contemplates administrative action
with the effect of law when it provides for a relatively formal administrative procedure tending to
foster the fairness and deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement of such force. . . . Thus,
the overwhelming number of our cases applying Chevron deference have reviewed the fruits of
notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication.”).
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pronouncements that carry the force of law. In fact, when Congress
codified the arbitrary and capricious standard for reviewing agency
action in the APA in 1946,42 it was actually adopting the “rational basis”
standard used by the Supreme Court to review most pieces of
congressional legislation.43 Under rational basis review, the Court asks
(1) whether the law at issue furthers a legitimate governmental purpose,
and (2) whether the law is rationally related to that purpose.44 As applied
to agencies, this rational basis test would ask whether the agency acted
in accordance with a legitimate statutory purpose—not just any
governmental purpose—as agencies’ powers are limited by the statutory
delegations made by Congress.
Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White45 provides the most
frequently cited pre-APA example of equating arbitrary and capricious
review to rational basis review. The Court stated:
With the wisdom of such a regulation we have, of course, no
concern. We may enquire only whether it is arbitrary or
capricious. That the requirement is not arbitrary or capricious
seems clear. That the type of container prescribed by Oregon is
an appropriate means for attaining permissible ends cannot be
doubted.46

42. The phrase “arbitrary or capricious” appears in the U.S. Reports 141 times before 1946: A
Westlaw search on July 8, 2009, of “arbitrar! /3 capricious! & da(bef 1946)” in the Supreme Court
opinion database retrieved 141 documents. Congress therefore was not trying to reinvent the wheel
by using the phrase “arbitrary or capricious,” but was rather adopting a standard for judicial review
of agency actions that the Supreme Court had been using in other contexts for years.
43. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 129–30 (1942) (“An Act of Congress is not to be
refused application by the courts as arbitrary and capricious and forbidden by the Due Process
Clause merely because it is deemed in a particular case to work an inequitable result.”); Nebbia v.
New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934) (“[T]he guaranty of due process, as has often been held,
demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious . . . .”); Dent v. West
Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889) (“[D]ue process of law . . . exclude[s] everything that is arbitrary and
capricious in legislation affecting the rights of the citizen.”). See also Jack M. Beermann & Gary
Lawson, Reprocessing Vermont Yankee, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 856, 870 (2007) (“[T]he passage
in § 706(2)(A) instructing courts to hold unlawful any agency action that is ‘arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law’ was probably intended in 1946 to
reflect something like the ‘rational basis’ test in post-1937 substantive due process law.” (citations
omitted)); Cross, supra note 13, at 1246 n.7 (“The original understanding of [arbitrary or capricious]
was that courts would reverse rules only when an agency ‘acted like a lunatic.’” (quoting Martin
Shapiro, APA: Past, Present, Future, 72 VA. L. REV. 447, 454 (1986))).
44. See infra notes 229–232 and accompanying text.
45. 296 U.S. 176 (1935).
46. Id. at 182 (emphases added).
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Pacific States Box even “expressly equated agencies with legislatures
for purposes of judicial review.”47 So when Congress used the phrase
“arbitrary or capricious” in the APA, it intended for courts to focus on
the agency’s purpose in regulating and the means used to achieve that
purpose, by applying the deferential rational basis standard used for
evaluating most congressional acts.48 Such a conclusion also coincides
with the historical context because the post-New Deal Congress was
weary of courts striking down portions of the regulatory state,49 as the
Supreme Court had done during the Lochner v. New York50 era that had
lasted until 1937.51
B.

Recognizing the Differences Between Agency Rulemaking and
Legislation

Of course, there are substantial reasons for subjecting agency action
to heightened standards of judicial review compared to legislation. An
agency promulgating rules is hardly the equivalent of Congress
legislating. Members of Congress are elected and are therefore
accountable to their constituents, while agencies are comprised of
appointed officials and civil servants who are not directly accountable to
47. Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505, 532 (1985);
see id. at 532 n.146 (quoting Pacific States Box, 296 U.S. at 186 (“[W]here the regulation is within
the scope of authority legally delegated, the presumption of the existence of facts justifying its
specific exercise attaches to statutes, to municipal ordinances, and to orders of administrative
bodies.”)).
48. As then-Professor Scalia pointed out, however, Congress probably expected the arbitrary or
capricious standard of review for informal rulemaking to apply to a much smaller set of cases than it
currently applies to. Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, The D.C. Circuit, and The
Supreme Court, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 375–78. That is because Congress could not have
predicted that, after the APA was enacted, the Court would greatly expand the circumstances when
agencies could use informal rulemaking instead of adjudication. Id. at 375–77. Nor could Congress
have predicted that the Court would establish “the principle that rules could be challenged in court
directly rather than merely in the context of an adjudicatory enforcement proceeding against a
particular individual.” Id. at 377.
49. See generally Matthew Warren, Active Judging: Judicial Philosophy and the Development of
the Hard Look Doctrine in the D.C. Circuit, 90 GEO. L.J. 2599, 2601 (2002) (“During the New Deal
era, the specter of Lochner v. New York and the fear of judicial invalidation of the regulatory state
loomed largely over administrative law.” (citation omitted)).
50. 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating a New York law that limited the working hours for bakers).
51. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding, under the
Commerce Clause, Congress’s power to regulate labor relations); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,
300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding Washington’s minimum wage law and rejecting a Lochner-based,
substantive due process freedom of contract rationale).
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the citizens of the United States.52 Moreover, when Congress legislates,
it must follow a “single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered,
procedure”:53 Presentment of congressional acts to the President could
result in a presidential veto, and the bicameral structure of Congress
requires “full study and debate in separate settings.”54 In contrast,
agencies can promulgate rules using the minimal set of informal
procedures listed in APA section 553: The agency must simply provide a
“[g]eneral notice of proposed rulemaking,” an opportunity for interested
persons to comment on the proposed rule through written submissions to
the agency, a “concise general statement” of the final rule’s “basis and
purpose,” and “publication” of the final rule.55 Undoubtedly, one of the
greatest advantages of agencies is their ability to quickly and efficiently
engage in informal rulemaking,56 but this also significantly undermines
the basis for treating agency rulemaking as the equivalent of legislation.
Heightened standards for reviewing agency rulemaking can also be
justified on the premise that there is not as much at stake in invalidating
an agency’s rule compared to striking down congressional legislation.
Congress can always amend its delegation to allow the agency to
promulgate the rule at issue (or Congress can just pass the rule through
legislation), so the “costs” of incorrectly applying heightened standards
are “drastically reduced when the consequence is simply to ‘remand’ the
question back to Congress instead of categorically prohibiting Congress
or agencies from acting.”57
On a more fundamental level, though, seeing the nondelegation
doctrine as an underenforced constitutional norm58 could provide a
52. See Jonathan R. Macey, Transaction Costs and the Normative Elements of the Public Choice
Model: An Application to Constitutional Theory, 74 VA. L. REV. 471, 517 (1988) (“[L]egislators
who want to avoid controversial or indeterminate decisions as to which interest groups to favor can
forfeit vast amounts of discretion (and thus responsibility and accountability) to administrative
agencies, which function outside of the tripartite legislative process envisioned by our constitutional
structure.”).
53. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
54. Id.
55. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006).
56. See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.15 (1970) (describing APA
informal rulemaking as being among the “greatest inventions of modern government”).
57. Scott A. Keller, How Courts Can Protect State Autonomy from Federal Administrative
Encroachment, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 45, 88 (2008) (quoting Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s
Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 91 (2004)).
58. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[W]hile the
doctrine of unconstitutional delegation is unquestionably a fundamental element of our
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constitutional basis for requiring heightened judicial review of agency
rulemaking compared to legislation.59 The Court rejects the
nondelegation doctrine largely because it wants to give Congress
adequate power to deal with an ever-increasing workload60 and because
it is unable to create a manageable nondelegation doctrine test—not
because the Court believes there are no problems with allowing
Congress to delegate legislative power to agencies.61 In light of these
“questions of propriety or capacity” relating to the Court’s abilities, the
Court has created a “judicial concept of [the] constitutional concept
[embodied by the nondelegation doctrine]” that is different from the
“[constitutional] concept itself.”62
But this does not mean that the “understanding of [the nondelegation

constitutional system, it is not an element readily enforceable by the courts.”); Cass R. Sunstein,
Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 338 (2000) (“The difficulty of drawing lines
between prohibited and permitted delegations makes it reasonable to conclude that for the most part,
the ban on unacceptable delegations is a judicially underenforced norm, and properly so.”). See
generally Keller, supra note 57, at 57–59 (discussing how the nondelegation doctrine is an
underenforced constitutional norm).
59. See Miles & Sunstein, Arbitrariness Review, supra note 13, at 762 (“[T]he hard look doctrine
might be seen as a second-best substitute for the original constitutional safeguards against the
uncontrolled exercise of discretion.”); Richard W. Murphy, The Limits of Legislative Control Over
the “Hard-Look,” 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1125, 1134–39 (2004) (suggesting that a congressional
amendment to the APA that restored Pacific States Box’s minimum rationality approach to judicial
review of agency action may be unconstitutional); Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy,
Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth Branch: Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate
Reasons for Agency Decisions, 1987 DUKE L.J. 387, 425 (arguing that “separation of powers
principles” require “heightened scrutiny of agency decisions”).
60. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. __ (Apr. 28, 2009), 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1823
(2009) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“The Federal Government
could not perform its duties in a responsible and effective way without administrative agencies.”);
J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 407–08 (1928) (permitting Congress to
delegate legislative power on the grounds that “common sense” allows Congress to delegate what it
cannot practicably do itself).
61. See Fox Television, 129 S. Ct. at 1817 (plurality opinion) (“There is no reason to magnify the
separation-of-powers dilemma posed by the Headless Fourth Branch by letting Article III judges—
like jackals stealing the lion’s kill—expropriate some of the power that Congress has wrested from
the unitary Executive.” (citation omitted)); Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard
of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1374 (2001) (explaining that the Court’s reluctance to enforce
the nondelegation doctrine “appears to stem from the judiciary’s limited institutional competence
rather than any fundamental disagreement with the doctrine’s goal.”); Murphy, supra note 59, at
1134 (stating that the courts could not “devise a stable, workable, desirable form of the
nondelegation doctrine”).
62. See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional
Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1217–18 (1978).
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doctrine] itself”63 cannot be enforced through other means, such as
applying heightened standards of judicial review of agency rulemaking
compared to legislation.64 In other words, if the Court had enforced the
constitutional concept of the nondelegation doctrine—that Congress
cannot delegate legislative power—agencies would never have been
permitted to exercise legislative power by promulgating rules carrying
the force of law.65 Due to the limits on the institutional competence of
courts, though, the Court has not enforced that constitutional concept
and has instead created the judicial concept of the nondelegation
doctrine: the intelligible principle test, which simply requires Congress
to provide some intelligible principle in the statutory delegation to cabin
the agency’s authority.66 Nevertheless, the Court could still impose
heightened standards of judicial review of agency rulemaking “as a
second-best surrogate” for the substantive enforcement of the
nondelegation doctrine.67
Given the inherent difference between agencies and Congress plus the
underenforcement of the nondelegation doctrine, it is no surprise that the
Supreme Court quickly began treating agency rulemaking differently
from congressional legislation. Just one year after the APA was enacted,
SEC v. Chenery68 reaffirmed a pre-APA ruling that a court should only
examine the actual purposes “invoked by the agency” instead of
“substituting what it considers to be a more adequate or proper basis.”69
63. Id. at 1218.
64. See Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 126 (2004)
(“[A]s Larry Sager has demonstrated, the fact that a norm is ‘under-enforced’—that is, enforced
through something short of a strong invalidation norm—does not mean the norm lacks grounding in
the Constitution.”); id. at 101 (arguing that courts should be permitted “to impose some restraint in
areas where constitutional norms would otherwise be ‘underenforced.’”).
65. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 985 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) (“This Court’s decisions
sanctioning such [administrative] delegations make clear that Art. I does not require all action with
the effect of legislation to be passed as law.”).
66. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472–76 (2001) (noting that the
nondelegation doctrine requires Congress to provide agencies with an intelligible principle, and that
such intelligible principles require very little specificity). For further discussion regarding the
dichotomy between constitutional concepts and judicial concepts, see Mitchell N. Berman,
Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 51–60 (2004).
67. Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2112
(1990).
68. SEC v. Chenery (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947).
69. Id. at 196. Four years earlier, when SEC v. Chenery was before the Supreme Court for the
first time, the Court required the agency “to give clear indication that it has exercised the discretion
with which Congress has empowered it.” SEC v. Chenery (Chenery I), 318 U.S. 80, 94–95 (1943).
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This marked a split from how the Court reviewed congressional action:
In 1946 (and through at least 1980), it was unclear whether rational basis
review allowed courts to consider any hypothetical, conceivable purpose
that Congress may have had in enacting a law, or only Congress’s actual
purpose.70 The former approach (consideration of any hypothetical,
conceivable purpose) is usually called “minimum rationality”; the latter
approach (consideration of actual purpose only) has become known as
“rational basis with bite.”71 Recently, the Supreme Court has clarified
that rational basis review of congressional acts entails the former
approach, such that courts can examine hypothetical, conceivable
purposes when reviewing congressional action.72 But since Chenery, the
Court has implicitly used the rational basis with bite approach in
reviewing agency action.
Of course, this observation about Chenery is made much easier in
hindsight: There is no indication that the Court thought about how
Chenery affected the rational basis test previously adopted in Pacific
States Box, and to this day the Court has not formally recognized the
rational basis with bite doctrine even in the context of judicial review of
legislation. To compound the ambiguity, Chenery never even cited the
APA or the arbitrary and capricious standard. The Chenery Court did not
view its decision as a groundbreaking precedent: It thought it was
reciting “[a] simple but fundamental rule of administrative law,” and it

Chenery I therefore held “that an administrative order cannot be upheld unless the grounds upon
which the agency acted in exercising its powers were those upon which its action can be sustained.”
Id. at 95. (Note that this Article primarily refers to Chenery I and Chenery II simply as “Chenery,”
as both cases stand for the same proposition. Throughout, the cases are distinguished only as needed
for clarity.).
70. Compare, e.g., U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980) (“It is, of course,
‘constitutionally irrelevant whether this reasoning in fact underlay the legislative decision,’ because
this Court has never insisted that a legislative body articulate its reasons for enacting a statute.”
(citation omitted)), with id. at 180–81 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I therefore believe
that we must discover a correlation between the classification and either the actual purpose of the
statute or a legitimate purpose that we may reasonably presume to have motivated an impartial
legislature.”), and id. at 188 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“A challenged classification may be sustained
only if it is rationally related to achievement of an actual legitimate governmental purpose.”).
71. See infra note 235.
72. See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313–15 (1993) (stating that courts
could consider any “conceivable” purpose under rational basis review, and “because we never
require a legislature to articulate its reasons for enacting a statute, it is entirely irrelevant for
constitutional purposes whether the conceived reason for the challenged distinction actually
motivated the legislature”).
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merely adopted one variant of the rational basis test over another.73 But
Chenery is the first sign that the Supreme Court would treat judicial
review of agency action differently than judicial review of congressional
action.
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe,74 the first Supreme Court
case to invoke the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard explicitly in
striking down an agency action, introduced a standard for judicial review
of agency action that looked nothing like the minimum rationality
review typically used for reviewing legislation.75 While Overton Park
dealt with an informal adjudication as opposed to the rulemaking that
Chenery addressed, it still should have been an easy case under Chenery
because Chenery implicitly embraced a more heightened standard than
minimum rationality.76 In particular, the analysis in Overton Park should
have been simple given the facts of the case: the Secretary of
Transportation had authorized the use of federal funds for building
Interstate 40 through Overton Park (a 342-acre city park near the center
of Memphis, Tennessee) without providing an explanation for this
authorization.77 According to the statutory delegation, though, the
Secretary could only have authorized these funds if no “feasible and
prudent” alternative route existed and there had been “all possible
planning to minimize harm” to the park.78 Because the Secretary “did
not indicate why he believed there were no feasible and prudent
alternative routes or why design changes could not be made to reduce
the harm to the park,”79 the Court could have just cited Chenery and
remanded for the agency to provide an explanation.
Instead, Overton Park contains six pages that infused all sorts of
ambiguity into the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard. On one
hand, Overton Park cited Pacific States Box for the proposition that an
agency’s “decision is entitled to a presumption of regularity,”80 and it
described arbitrary and capricious review as a “narrow” standard
73. Chenery, 332 U.S. at 196.
74. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
75. Id.
76. Chenery, 332 U.S. at 196.
77. 401 U.S. at 408.
78. Id. at 405 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1964 ed., Supp. V)); 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1964 ed.,
Supp. V)).
79. Id. at 408.
80. Id. at 415 (citing Pac. States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 185 (1935)).
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through which “[t]he court is not empowered to substitute its judgment
for that of the agency.”81 But then the Court erratically described
arbitrary and capricious review as “thorough, probing, in-depth
review,”82 which was supposed to be “searching and careful.”83 So while
Overton Park paid lip service to Pacific States Box’s rational basis
approach, Overton Park ultimately explained that arbitrary and
capricious review required courts to “consider whether the decision was
based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has
been a clear error of judgment.”84 It also directed courts to examine the
agency’s “construction of the evidence” if the agency did “not disclose
the factors that were considered.”85
Given that the statutory delegation at issue required the Secretary to
address alternatives and plan to minimize the harm to parks, Overton
Park’s requirement that the agency consider all “the relevant factors”
probably only meant that the agency had to explain how these statutory
predicates for exercising its delegated authority were met. That is
precisely what Chenery had already held. However, lower courts—in
particular the D.C. Circuit—would read Overton Park much more
broadly.
C.

Analyzing Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking Without
Reference to Doctrines for Judicial Review of Legislation

The solid basis for subjecting agency rulemaking to heightened
standards of judicial review compared to legislation does not necessarily
mean that doctrines for review of agency rulemaking should completely
ignore the doctrines for review of legislation. Similar modes of analysis
could be used for both, and the precedent on judicial review of
legislation could support courts’ interpretation of arbitrary and
capricious review—even if courts want to impose a heightened standard
of review for agency rulemaking.
It would have made sense for courts to place the APA’s arbitrary and
capricious standard somewhere on the tiers-of-scrutiny sliding scale used
for judicial review of legislation. Unfortunately, instead of linking
81. Id. at 416.
82. Id. at 415.
83. Id. at 416.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 420.
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judicial review of agency rulemaking to judicial review of legislation,
courts began concocting an ever-growing list of ways to invalidate
agency action under APA arbitrary and capricious review. It started with
the D.C. Circuit creating the “hard look” doctrine in the 1970s under the
guise of arbitrary and capricious review, and continued because the
Supreme Court’s reaction to the D.C. Circuit’s hard look doctrine
provided little guidance to lower courts. This resulted in an unclear,
arbitrary doctrine for judicial review of agency action with no link to the
doctrines for judicial review of legislation. The Court’s recent decision
in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., though, may have changed all of
this.
1.

The D.C. Circuit Replaced “Arbitrary and Capricious” with
“Hard Look”

By 1971, when Overton Park was decided, many believed that
agencies were no longer “acting in the public interest” because they “had
been captured by the industries and private interests that they
regulated.”86 Against this backdrop, the D.C. Circuit—the court that
reviews most federal agency actions87—became skeptical of agency
action, and it used Overton Park as an opening to implement the “hard
look” doctrine under arbitrary and capricious review.88
Originally, the hard look doctrine required courts to ensure that the
agency had taken a hard look at the regulatory issues.89 Over time,
however, the D.C. Circuit morphed the hard look doctrine “into one that
required a hard look not just by the agency, but by the court as well.”90
As now-D.C. Circuit Judge Garland recognized, the D.C. Circuit
developed three iterations of its hard look doctrine: procedural, quasiprocedural, and substantive hard look.91 Regardless of who was required
to do the hard looking, in each of these three iterations, the D.C.
86. Warren, supra note 49, at 2602 (citing Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American
Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1681–88 (1975)).
87. See Scalia, supra note 48, at 348 (explaining that the D.C. Circuit “handles the vast majority
of significant rulemaking appeals”).
88. The phrase “hard look” was first coined in the administrative law context by Judge Harold
Leventhal. See Pikes Peak Broad. Co. v. FCC, 422 F.2d 671, 682 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Leventhal, J.).
89. See Nat’l Lime Ass’n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 451 n.126 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (“[A]s originally
articulated the words ‘hard look’ described the agency’s responsibility and not the courts’.”).
90. Garland, supra note 47, at 526 (citing Nat’l Lime Ass’n, 627 F.2d at 451–52 n.126).
91. Id. at 525, 530, 534.
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Circuit’s hard look doctrine gave courts much more authority to
invalidate agency action than the rational basis review originally
contemplated by the APA—and no variant of the hard look doctrine was
linked to the doctrines for judicial review of congressional action.92
Procedural hard look, the original version of the hard look doctrine,
ensured that the “agency itself had taken a hard look at the relevant
issues before reaching its decision,” by requiring the agency to use
various procedures—not otherwise required by statute—that expanded
the ability of interested parties to present their arguments to the
agency.93 For instance, using procedural hard look, the D.C. Circuit
required “adjudicatory-type hearing procedures” such as crossexamination and oral hearings for informal rulemaking,94 even though
APA section 55395 enumerates which procedures are required for
informal rulemaking and says nothing about cross-examination and oral
hearings.96 D.C. Circuit Judge David Bazelon championed procedural
hard look as “the best way for courts to guard against unreasonable or
erroneous administrative decisions,” instead of “scrutiniz[ing] the
technical merits of each decision.”97
Quasi-procedural hard look required the agency to adopt various
procedures with which the agency itself had to comply in reaching its
substantive decision.98 These requirements therefore had a “procedural
tinge” and yet a “substantive aspect.”99 In other words, quasi-procedural
92. Credit has been given to the D.C. Circuit as a whole for adopting the hard look doctrine under
the guise of arbitrary and capricious review. See Scalia, supra note 48, at 348 n.13 (suggesting that
the hard look doctrine had, “on one occasion or another, received the explicit support of most of the
[D.C. Circuit’s] members”). However, specific judges, such as Judges Harold Leventhal and David
Bazelon, are widely recognized as having the greatest influence on the development of the hard look
doctrine. See Warren, supra note 49, at 2607–26 (discussing the different approaches to the hard
look doctrine espoused by Judges Leventhal and Bazelon).
93. See Garland, supra note 47, at 525.
94. Scalia, supra note 48, at 348; accord Garland, supra note 47, at 529 & n.123 (citing Mobil
Oil Corp. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 483 F.2d 1238, 1259, 1262–63 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Int’l Harvester
Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 649 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
95. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006) (requiring informal rulemaking to include a “[g]eneral notice of
proposed rulemaking,” an opportunity for “interested persons” to comment on the proposed rule
through written submissions to the agency, a “concise general statement” of the final rule’s “basis
and purpose,” and “publication” of the final rule).
96. Garland, supra note 47, at 529 & n.123.
97. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 66 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (Bazelon, J., concurring).
98. Garland, supra note 47, at 530.
99. Id.
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hard look “requir[ed] specification of the agency’s policy premises, its
reasoning, and its factual support.”100 These requirements went to the
“internal thought process by which an agency decisionmaker reaches a
rational decision”—as opposed to procedural hard look, whose
requirements went to the “the external process by which litigants present
their arguments to the agency.”101 Yet, quasi-procedural hard look did
not directly address the agency’s substantive policy choice. Rather,
quasi-procedural hard look required agencies to “respond[] to significant
points made during the public comment period,” consider “significant
alternatives,” and examine “all relevant factors.”102
Under substantive hard look, the D.C. Circuit reviewed the agency’s
ultimate policy conclusions by “infusing greater rigor into the traditional
‘rational basis’ test,”103 and it began “intensive[ly]” scrutinizing the
“record support for agencies’ findings of fact.”104 The seeds for
substantive hard look were sown as early as 1970, when Judge Harold
Leventhal’s dicta in Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC105 referred
to a “hard look” doctrine that “call[ed] on the court[s] to intervene not
merely in case of procedural inadequacies” but anytime the agency had
“not genuinely engaged in reasoned decision-making.”106 Note the
shifting standard: “arbitrary and capricious” became “hard look,” which
became “reasoned decision-making.” “[R]easoned decision-making” is a

100. Id. at 526 (citing Nat’l Lime Ass’n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 453 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Columbia
Gas Transmission Corp. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 628 F.2d 578, 593 (D.C Cir. 1979)).
101. Id. at 530 (quasi-procedural hard look sets forth “the kind of decisionmaking record the
agency must produce to survive judicial review”—not the “kind of procedure that an agency must
use to generate a record . . .”).
102. Id. at 527 (citing Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1977)); William
H. Rodgers, Jr., A Hard Look at Vermont Yankee: Environmental Law Under Close Scrutiny, 67
GEO. L.J. 699, 704–08 (1979)); see also Am. Radio Relay League, Inc. v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 244
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (Tatel, J., concurring) (“In previous informal rulemaking cases, we ordered
additional agency disclosures to facilitate meaningful arbitrary and capricious review . . . .”).
103. Garland, supra note 47, at 534 (citing Recording Indus. Ass’n v. Copyright Royalty
Tribunal, 662 F.2d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Nat’l Lime Ass’n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 451 n.126 (D.C.
Cir. 1980); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1978)).
104. Id. at 535 (citing Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co. v. United States, 742 F.2d 644, 651–52 (D.C. Cir.
1984); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 735 F.2d 1525, 1531–34 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Public
Citizen v. Steed, 733 F.2d 93, 99, 102–03, 105 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc. v.
Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, 734 F.2d 1486, 1515–16, 1519 (D.C. Cir. 1984); ILGWU v. Donovan,
722 F.2d 795, 818–26 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
105. 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Leventhal, J.).
106. Id. at 851 (emphasis added).
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much more open-ended standard of review than the rational basis test
contemplated by Pacific States Box. This equivocation on the term
“reasonable” even caused Judge Bazelon to criticize Judge Leventhal’s
substantive hard look as an inquiry that “inevitably invites judges of
opposing views to make plausible-sounding, but simplistic, judgments of
the relative weight to be afforded various pieces of technical data.”107
Eventually, the Supreme Court joined this debate, which had been
brewing in the D.C. Circuit for nearly a decade, but the Court’s reaction
did not bring the debate to an end.
2.

The Supreme Court’s Reaction to the D.C. Circuit’s Hard Look
Doctrine

To this day, the Supreme Court has not definitively addressed all
three iterations of the D.C. Circuit’s hard look doctrine.108 The Supreme
Court clearly rejected procedural hard look in Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.109 While some
107. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 66 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (Bazelon, J., concurring).
Judge Leventhal responded by arguing that “Congress has been willing to delegate its legislative
powers broadly and courts have upheld such delegation because there is court review to assure that
the agency exercises the delegated power within statutory limits, and that it fleshes out objectives
within those limits by an administration that is not irrational or discriminatory.” Id. at 68–69
(Leventhal, J., concurring).
108. The Supreme Court has described the extra procedures imposed by the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) as requiring the agency to take a “‘hard look’ at environmental
consequences.” Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976) (quoting Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 838 (D.C. Cir. 1972)), quoted in Winter v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 555 U.S. __ (Nov. 12, 2008), 129 S. Ct. 365, 376 (2008); Robertson v. Methow
Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989); Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983); see also Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 374
(1989) (“NEPA does require that agencies take a ‘hard look’ at the environmental effects of their
planned action . . . .”), quoted in Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 72 (2004).
This “hard look” has no bearing on the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard of review, and only
applies in environmental cases under NEPA. Because a statute other than the APA (i.e., NEPA) is
imposing additional procedures, this line of cases does not conflict with Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978), which held that
courts could not impose additional procedures on agencies beyond those required by statute.
Moreover, this hard look under NEPA has nothing to do with substantive review, as “it is now well
settled that NEPA itself does not mandate particular results, but simply prescribes the necessary
process.” Robertson, 490 U.S. at 350.
109. 435 U.S. 519 (1978). See Garland, supra note 47, at 529 (explaining that Vermont Yankee
was limited to rejecting procedural hard look); Scalia, supra note 48, at 356 (noting that Vermont
Yankee was decided on the basis of “inadequacy of procedures” and not “inadequacy of record
support”); Warren, supra note 49, at 2631 (stating that Vermont Yankee rejected Judge Bazelon’s
procedural hard look).
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commentators have posited that the Court accepted quasi-procedural and
substantive hard look in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,110 that is an over-reading of
State Farm. Rather than adopting any part of the hard look doctrine,
State Farm merely gave an amorphous list of criteria for invalidating
agency action—in dicta. And then Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.111 created a large escape hatch from
State Farm.
a.

Vermont Yankee Rejected Procedural Hard Look

A unanimous Supreme Court came down hard on the D.C. Circuit in
Vermont Yankee by rejecting procedural hard look. Vermont Yankee held
that APA section 553112 “established the maximum procedural
requirements which Congress was willing to have the courts impose
upon agencies in conducting rulemaking procedures.”113 The agency in
Vermont Yankee had not allowed the interested parties to use discovery
or cross-examination during the rulemaking proceedings, neither of
which is required by APA section 553.114 The D.C. Circuit “refrained
from actually ordering the agency to follow any specific procedures,”115
and claimed that it did not want to “intrude on the agency’s province by
dictating to it which, if any, [procedures not required by APA section

110. 463 U.S. 29 (1983). See, e.g., Garland, supra note 47, at 543 (“On one level, the State Farm
decision is a ringing endorsement of the quasi-procedural hard look.”); id. at 545 (recognizing that
both elements of the substantive hard look—scrutiny of the agency’s record and a heightened
standard of review going beyond minimum rationality—appeared in State Farm); Kagan, supra note
11, at 2372 (explaining that courts regularly review “agencies’ decisionmaking processes under the
‘hard look’ standard exemplified in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n of the United States v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.”); Warren, supra note 49, at 2631 (“[T]he Supreme Court
finally used the substantive hard look standard to overturn an agency action in [State Farm].”).
111. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
112. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006).
113. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524
(1978).
114. Scalia, supra note 48, at 353; see Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 541 (noting that the
intervenors argued that they should have been afforded the opportunity for “discovery or crossexamination”); id. at 535 (“[D]espite the fact that it appeared that the agency employed all the
procedures required by 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976 ed.) and more, the court determined the proceedings to
be inadequate and overturned the rule.”).
115. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 541 (citing Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Comm’n, 547 F.2d 633, 653–54 (D.C. Cir. 1976)).
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553] it must adopt to flesh out the record.”116 Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court construed the D.C. Circuit’s opinion as holding that the
procedures used during the rulemaking “were inadequate,” and the Court
reversed on the basis that the D.C. Circuit had required the agency to use
extra-statutory procedures.117 Rebuking the D.C. Circuit, the Supreme
Court explained that “[t]he fundamental policy questions appropriately
resolved in Congress and in the state legislatures are not subject to
reexamination in the federal courts under the guise of judicial review of
agency action.”118
Vermont Yankee has been read to have virtually no bearing on the
APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard. That is because Vermont
Yankee separated the issue of whether courts could impose extrastatutory procedures for informal rulemaking from the issue of whether
the agency had acted arbitrarily or capriciously: The Court stated that, on
remand, the D.C. Circuit was “entirely free” to find that the rule adopted
by the agency was “arbitrary and capricious.”119
Vermont Yankee therefore rejected the D.C. Circuit’s procedural hard
look without addressing the validity of the quasi-procedural or
substantive hard looks. This is because neither the quasi-procedural nor
substantive hard look doctrine purports to impose extra-statutory
procedures in violation of Vermont Yankee. Rather, both involve
reference to the record of an agency’s rulemaking process to determine
whether an agency has acted arbitrarily or capriciously. Vermont Yankee
did not explicitly answer whether courts could review “the inadequacy
of the record to support the agency decision.”120 The inadequacy of
support in the record may implicate the amount of procedure used “if
one chooses to regard certain evidence as inherently unreliable unless it
has been subjected to particular procedural tests.”121 Stated another way,
a court could find that an agency acted arbitrarily or capriciously by not
establishing a record for appellate review that adequately responded to
public comments, considered alternatives, or examined relevant
factors—even though APA section 553 does not require the agency to
116. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 547 F.2d 633, 653
(D.C. Cir. 1976), rev’d sub nom. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 558.
117. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 542.
118. Id. at 558.
119. Id. at 535 n.14 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976)).
120. Scalia, supra note 48, at 354.
121. Id.
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create a contemporaneous record or respond to public comments.122 So
while Vermont Yankee came down hard on the D.C. Circuit, it was still
unclear whether the D.C. Circuit’s quasi-procedural and substantive hard
look doctrines survived Vermont Yankee.123
b.

State Farm Lists Criteria for Invalidating Agency Action,
Without Addressing Quasi-Procedural or Substantive Hard
Look

Finally, in 1983, the Supreme Court provided some gloss on the
APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard in State Farm, which remains
the Court’s definitive case on arbitrary and capricious review. Most of
this gloss, however, was dicta. Moreover, the parties were focused on
whether the arbitrary and capricious standard was equivalent to
minimum rationality review or no review at all in the context of agency
deregulation; they were not focused on the precise contours of a
heightened standard for judicial review of agency rulemaking that went
beyond the standard applied to legislation.124
State Farm held that the Court would not treat agency rulemaking as
the equivalent of legislation, thereby rejecting the minimum rationality
approach to arbitrary and capricious review.125 And State Farm nixed the
argument that deregulation should be treated like agency inaction, which

122. Cf. United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 251–52 (2d Cir. 1977)
(requiring an agency to create a contemporaneous record during informal rulemaking and to respond
to any cogent public comments).
123. See Garland, supra note 47, at 529 & n.128 (“The critical question for the hard look doctrine
was whether Vermont Yankee’s proscription of ‘extra procedural devices’ applied to the
requirements that an agency explain itself, examine objections and relevant factors, and consider
alternatives. Opponents of the doctrine argued it did.” (citing Public Sys. v. Fed. Energy Reg.
Comm’n, 606 F.2d 973, 983, 984, 986 (Robb, J., dissenting))); id. at 530 (“The Supreme Court’s
own view regarding the validity of the quasi-procedural requirements was unclear.”).
124. See, e.g., Brief of Respondents State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., et al., at 12–
19, Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (No. 82-354),
available at LEXIS 1982 U.S. Briefs 354 (U.S. Feb. 7, 1983), at *27–36 (arguing against the
Federal Parties’ position that the arbitrary and capricious standard meant rational basis review and
against the petitioners’ view that agency deregulation was unreviewable because it was more like
agency inaction).
125. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 n.9 (“The Department of Transportation suggests that the
arbitrary and capricious standard requires no more than the minimum rationality a statute must bear
under the Due Process Clause. We do not view as equivalent the presumption of constitutionality
afforded legislation drafted by Congress and the presumption of regularity afforded an agency in
fulfilling its statutory mandate.”).
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would have made deregulation basically unreviewable.126 But the
contours of the heightened standard adopted in State Farm largely
remain a mystery.
In State Farm, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
had rescinded its regulation that had required new cars to include passive
restraints—airbags, detachable automatic seatbelts, or nondetachable
automatic seatbelts.127 The agency explained that it could no longer
conclude that the safety benefits from the passive restraint regulation
would outweigh the approximately $1 billion it would cost the
automobile industry to comply with this regulation.128 According to the
agency, when it initially promulgated the passive restraint regulation, it
estimated that sixty percent of new cars would be equipped with airbags
and forty percent would be equipped with automatic seatbelts; however,
by 1981, when it rescinded the regulation, the industry planned to
comply with the passive restraint regulation by installing detachable
automatic seatbelts in ninety-nine percent of new cars.129 While
detachable automatic seatbelts did comply with the regulation, the
agency reasoned that achieving compliance in this manner would not
result in significant safety benefits because the detachable belts required
“the same type of affirmative action that is the stumbling block to
obtaining high usage levels of manual belts.”130 The Court unanimously
invalidated the rescission of the airbag and nondetachable seatbelt
alternatives, and, by a 5–4 vote invalidated the rescission of the
detachable seatbelt alternative.131
Just like Overton Park, State Farm began its exposition on arbitrary
and capricious review by noting that the standard was “narrow,” but
explained that “the agency must examine the relevant data and articulate
a satisfactory explanation for its action.”132 Instead of simply deciding
that some heightened standard applied and then providing only the
dispositive factor for deciding the case, State Farm rattled off a list of
criteria—in dicta—that courts could use to find agency action arbitrary

126. Id. at 41–42.
127. Id. at 37–38.
128. Id. at 38–39.
129. Id. at 38.
130. Id. at 39 (quoting 46 Fed. Reg. 53,419, 53,421 (Oct. 29, 1981)).
131. Id. at 54; id. at 58 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
132. Id. at 43 (majority opinion).
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or capricious133:
Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if
the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not
intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important
aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision
that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so
implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view
or the product of agency expertise.134
Because State Farm’s dicta criteria for invalidating agency action
look quite similar to some of the reasons given by the D.C. Circuit for
invalidating agency action, many have posited that State Farm endorsed
both the quasi-procedural and substantive hard look doctrines.135 Plus,
the Court distinguished Vermont Yankee on the basis that State Farm’s
arbitrary and capricious test did not “require . . . any specific
procedures” for the agency to use, which was a rationale frequently
invoked under the D.C. Circuit’s quasi-procedural hard look.136
Distinguishing State Farm from Vermont Yankee on the basis that State
Farm was not requiring any specific procedures is especially peculiar
because Vermont Yankee had rejected that precise rationale.137
Moreover, in the portion of State Farm that only five Justices joined, the
Court stated that agency action must be “supported by the record and
reasonably explained,” such that the Court could conclude that the
agency engaged in “reasoned decisionmaking.”138 And these same five
Justices even quoted the D.C. Circuit’s seminal substantive hard look
decision, Greater Boston, approvingly.139
But multiple facets of State Farm suggest that the Supreme Court was
133. See Garland, supra note 47, at 545 (describing State Farm as “[r]eciting a veritable litany of
[quasi-procedural] requirements”).
134. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43.
135. See, e.g., Garland, supra note 47, at 543 (“On one level, the State Farm decision is a ringing
endorsement of the quasi-procedural hard look.”); id. at 545 (recognizing that both elements of the
substantive hard look—scrutiny of the agency’s record and a heightened standard of review going
beyond minimum rationality—appeared in State Farm); Warren, supra note 49, 2631 (“[T]he
Supreme Court finally used the substantive hard look standard to overturn an agency action in [State
Farm].”).
136. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 50–51.
137. See supra notes 113–118 and accompanying text.
138. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 52.
139. Id. at 57 (quoting Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir.
1971)).
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not completely signing on to the D.C. Circuit’s quasi-procedural and
substantive hard look doctrines. For one thing, the Supreme Court has
not used the label “hard look” to describe APA arbitrary and capricious
review after State Farm, whereas the Court does use “hard look” to
explain the additional procedures required by the National
Environmental Policy Act.140 State Farm also clarified that, contrary to
quasi-procedural hard look, it was not requiring an agency “to consider
all policy alternatives in reaching [a] decision.”141 Rather, the Court
made it abundantly clear that the deregulatory posture of the case
required the agency to consider the rescinded alternatives.142 In other
words, the agency needed to consider the rescinded alternatives only
because it had previously made the factual finding that airbags and
automatic seatbelts were a cost-effective way of savings lives.
Once one accepts this unique rule that an agency must consider a
rescinded alternative based on a previous factual finding made by the
agency, most of State Farm becomes a simple case under Chenery. The
agency’s explanation of the rescission did not address airbags or
nondetachable automatic seatbelts. The obvious flaw in the agency’s
reasoning for rescinding the entire regulation is that airbags or
nondetachable seatbelts may have improved car safety, even if
detachable seatbelts would not have. Combining State Farm’s
deregulation rule that an agency must consider the rescinded alternatives
based on a previous factual finding, with Chenery’s requirement that the
agency must provide the explanation for its actions, shows why the
agency in State Farm should have explained why a regulation requiring
new cars to have airbags or nondetachable seatbelts would not have
resulted in significant safety benefits. Because the agency did not
address airbags or nondetachable automatic seatbelts whatsoever, the
rescission of those alternatives was illogical and would have failed under
Chenery’s rational basis with bite approach.143 Indeed, all nine
140. See supra note 108.
141. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 51.
142. See id. at 51 (“But the airbag is more than a policy alternative to the passive restraint
standard: it is a technological alternative within the ambit of the existing standard. We hold only
that given the judgment made in 1977 that airbags are an effective and cost-beneficial life-saving
technology, the mandatory passive-restraint rule may not be abandoned without any consideration
whatsoever of an airbags-only requirement.”).
143. By way of analogy, assume a cook put pepperoni, sausage, and mushrooms on your frozen
pizza. Before putting it into the oven, the cook asks you whether you want all three of those
toppings. You respond, “I don’t like mushrooms, so please take off the mushrooms, pepperoni, and
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Justices—including Justice Rehnquist who wrote Vermont Yankee—held
that the rescission of the airbag and nondetachable seatbelt alternatives
was arbitrary and capricious.144
State Farm’s 5–4 split over the detachable seatbelt alternative145 was
the significant dispute in the case that could not be resolved simply by
Chenery, because the agency did explain why it rescinded this
alternative.146 As the agency indicated, “[o]nce a detachable automatic
belt is detached, it becomes identical to a manual belt.”147 Thus, if a
person detaches the automatic belt, “its use thereafter requires the same
type of affirmative action that is the stumbling block to obtaining high
usage levels of manual belts.”148 Justice White’s majority opinion held
the agency acted arbitrarily or capriciously because it did not account for
“inertia” favoring seatbelt use based on the fact that “the passive belt,
once reattached, will continue to function automatically unless again
disconnected.”149 Justice Rehnquist’s dissent, which was joined by three
other Justices, acknowledged that the agency’s explanation was “by no
means a model.”150 Yet it found the explanation “adequate” because it
articulated a “rational connection between the facts found and the choice
made.”151
Regardless of who has the better of that debate, note that Justice
White’s majority opinion did not actually use or endorse the D.C.
Circuit’s hard look doctrine and it did not use most of the criteria for
sausage.” That is the same form of illogical reasoning used by the agency in State Farm.
144. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 58 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“In
particular, I agree that, since the airbag and [nondetachable] automatic seatbelt were explicitly
approved in the standard the agency was rescinding, the agency should explain why it declined to
leave those requirements intact. In this case, the agency gave no explanation at all. Of course, if the
agency can provide a rational explanation, it may adhere to its decision to rescind the entire
standard.”).
145. See id. at 58 (“I do not believe, however, that NHTSA’s view of detachable automatic
seatbelts was arbitrary and capricious.”).
146. 46 Fed. Reg. 53,419, 53,421–54,326 (Oct. 29, 1981), cited in State Farm, 463 U.S. at 58–59
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
147. 46 Fed. Reg. at 53,421.
148. Id., quoted in State Farm, 463 U.S. at 39.
149. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 54; see also Brief of Respondents, supra note 124, at 40, available
at LEXIS 1982 U.S. Briefs 354, at *70 (“Since detachable automatic belts overcome these causes
and put inertia on the side of wearing belts, the assumption that detachables would do no better than
manual belts is contrary to the record.”).
150. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 58 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
151. Id. at 58–59 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).

448

Keller_Article_DTPed[1].docx (Do Not Delete)

8/31/2009 7:40 PM

Depoliticizing Review of Rulemaking
invalidating agency action that it had previously listed in dicta—i.e., it
did not make reference to the agency “rel[ying] on factors which
Congress has not intended it to consider” or “offer[ing] an explanation
for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is
so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the
product of agency expertise.”152 The majority’s dispositive holding
basically turned on the criterion of the agency’s “fail[ure] to consider an
important aspect of the problem”153—inertia, a real-world aspect about
the nature of detachable automatic seatbelts. While Justice White
referenced the rulemaking record material, he explicitly noted that the
agency had the discretion to ignore the empirical evidence at issue.154
The majority’s holding did not turn on a requirement that the agency
produce additional data, respond to more comments, or consider other
statutory purposes—as the hard look doctrine would have required.
Moreover, it did not foreclose the agency from providing an explanation
of why the inertia from detachable seatbelts actually would not result in
increased seatbelt usage.155
To be sure, the State Farm majority used a stricter standard for
reviewing agency rulemaking than the dissent, but the precise contours
of that stricter standard remained unclear. What emerged from State
Farm was not that the Supreme Court adopted any part of the D.C.
Circuit’s hard look doctrine wholesale. Rather, State Farm (1)
established that agency deregulation is reviewed under the APA’s
arbitrary and capricious standard, (2) rejected the minimum rationality
approach to arbitrary and capricious review, and (3) required an agency
to consider a rescinded alternative based on a previous factual finding
made by the agency. Of course, one year later, the Supreme Court in
Chevron changed these rules of APA arbitrary and capricious review in
152. Id. at 43 (majority opinion).
153. Id.
154. Both Justice White’s majority opinion and Justice Rehnquist’s dissenting opinion agreed that
the agency had the discretion to ignore a survey of drivers showing that detachable seatbelts were
used twice as much as manual belts, because that study had sample problems and the conditions
differed from typical cars. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 53 (“We believe that it is within the agency’s
discretion to pass upon the generalizability of these field studies.”); id. at 58 (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“It is reasonable for the agency to decide that this study
does not support any conclusion concerning the effect of automatic seatbelts . . . .”).
155. See id. at 54 (majority opinion) (whether inertia from detachable seatbelts would increase
seatbelt usage “is a matter for the agency to decide, but it must bring its expertise to bear on the
question”).
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cases involving an agency’s statutory interpretation.
c.

Chevron Creates a Large Exception to State Farm

Most see Chevron as solely a case about deference to agency statutory
interpretations. But Chevron actually involved a specific type of
arbitrary and capricious review—review of an agency’s interpretation of
a statute it administers.156 Chevron referred to the arbitrary and
capricious standard157 while never mentioning State Farm.158 After
viewing Chevron as an arbitrary and capricious review case, one can
also see that Chevron created a large escape hatch from Chenery’s
requirement that an agency must explain its actions and from State
Farm’s list of criteria in dicta for invalidating agency rulemaking.159
Chevron announced a two-step inquiry for reviewing an “agency’s
construction of the statute which it administers.”160 First (“Chevron Step
One”), courts “must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress.”161 Second (“Chevron Step Two”), “if the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is
whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of
the statute.”162 So, for purposes of Chevron, an agency need not

156. See, e.g., North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 906 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (stating that Chevron
Step Two was State Farm’s arbitrary and capricious standard); Arent v. Shalala, 70 F.3d 610, 615
(D.C Cir. 1995) (“Chevron review and arbitrary and capricious review overlap at the margins. But it
would be a mistake to view this case as one involving typical Chevron review.”). See also Garland,
supra note 47, at 550 (“But the line between reviewing the validity of an agency’s statutory
interpretations and reviewing the reasonableness of its policies is often a fine one . . . . The
teachings of Chevron, therefore, cannot be dismissed as inapplicable to the arbitrary and capricious
test.”); Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1253, 1254 (1997) (proposing that Chevron Step Two and the APA’s arbitrary and capricious test
“be deemed not just overlapping, but identical”).
157. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)
(stating that reasonable agency interpretations warranted deference unless they were “arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute”).
158. See Garland, supra note 47, at 550 (“The Court treated Chevron purely as a case of statutory
construction—neither State Farm nor the APA was even mentioned—and arguably the two cases
can be distinguished on that ground.”).
159. Compare Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Me. Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 418–20 (1992)
(deferring to the agency under Chevron), with id. at 425–27 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
agency action was invalid under State Farm).
160. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
161. Id. at 843.
162. Id.
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articulate the connection between its interpretation and the statutory
language, as “a court may not substitute its own construction of a
statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the
administrator of an agency.”163
Chevron therefore revitalized the minimum rationality approach to
arbitrary and capricious review in the context of agency statutory
interpretation.164 By not requiring the agency to explain why it
interpreted a statute in a certain manner, Chevron implicitly created an
exception to Chenery’s holding that the agency must provide the
explanation to justify its act. On the other hand, how one interprets the
term “reasonable” determines whether the Chevron test looks more like
rational basis review of legislation (i.e., minimum rationality review) or
the D.C. Circuit’s hard look doctrine. If Chevron Step Two is interpreted
as a return to minimum rationality review in the narrow context of
agency statutory interpretation, Chevron creates at least one escape hatch
from the more stringent State Farm inquiry. Chevron seemed to suggest
that this was in fact how to interpret Chevron Step Two, as the Court
went to great lengths to emphasize the deference that should be accorded
to agencies.165
Then again, the Supreme Court recently added another prong to the
Chevron inquiry—“Chevron Step Zero.” Chevron Step Zero reduces
deference to agency statutory interpretations made through less formal
means than notice-and-comment rulemaking (such as guidance
documents and ruling letters) by examining factors that look a lot like
the D.C. Circuit’s hard look doctrine.166 The Court, however, has

163. Id. at 844 (emphasis added); see also Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet
Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005) (reasonable agency interpretation still accorded deference even if
it contradicts a court’s previous interpretation). Of course, a change in agency position (like
deregulation) made through statutory interpretation could still be invalidated pursuant to State
Farm, even though the position would be reasonable under Chevron.
164. See Paul R. Verkuil, The Wait is Over: Chevron as the Stealth Vermont Yankee II, 75 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 921, 922–23 (2007) (“[Chevron’s] connection to the State Farm dissent implies that
hard-look review should have been moderated by Chevron’s broad acceptance of the role of the
political branches in determining policy. After Chevron, in effect, hard-look review was supposed to
be more bark than bite.”).
165. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (“We have long recognized that considerable weight should be
accorded to an executive department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to
administer, and the principle of deference to administrative interpretations.” (footnote omitted)).
166. See Keller, supra note 57, at 68–69 (discussing Chevron Step Zero and explaining that
Chevron deference could be rejected if the agency lacked expertise, changed positions, did not
carefully consider the relevant issues, or was addressing an important issue) (citing Gonzales v.
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explained that agency notice-and-comment rulemaking will always pass
the Chevron Step Zero doctrine for deference, so that development has
basically not affected judicial review of agency rulemaking.167
* * *
State Farm and its Chevron exception represent the Court’s reaction
to the D.C. Circuit’s hard look doctrine, and thus the two cases became
the definitive precedents on APA arbitrary and capricious review. But
State Farm and Chevron left lower courts without much guidance on
how to review agency action. State Farm opened the door for courts to
scrutinize the substantive policy decisions made by agencies, but then
Chevron instructed lower courts to apply minimum rationality review to
agency statutory interpretation. As many, including then-Judge Breyer,
noted, that combination set up a doctrine for review of agency action
that seemed completely backwards: Courts were to defer to agencies on
questions of law relating to statutory interpretation, but were to nitpick
substantive agency policy conclusions on matters in which judges lacked
institutional competence.168 In the twenty-five years after State Farm
and Chevron were decided, the Court offered virtually no other guidance
on APA arbitrary and capricious review. But the Court’s recent decision
in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. has finally provided lower courts
with additional guidance on how to review agency action. Fox
Television has replaced State Farm as the Court’s definitive precedent
on APA arbitrary and capricious review.
3.

FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. Implicitly Rejects the D.C.
Circuit’s Hard Look Doctrine and Eliminates State Farm’s
Criteria for Invalidating Agency Action

The Supreme Court’s April 2009 decision in FCC v. Fox Television
Stations, Inc. significantly limited the discretion of courts to invalidate
agency action.169 In doing so, the Court implicitly rejected the D.C.
Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 267–68 (2006); Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002); United States
v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001); Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587
(2000))).
167. See id. at 67–68 & nn.117–18 (explaining that Chevron Step Zero will not reduce the
deference accorded to agencies when the agencies engage in informal rulemaking).
168. Steven Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363,
388–94 (1986).
169. Fox Television did not involve an informal rulemaking, but rather an adjudication. FCC v.
Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. __ (Apr. 28, 2009), 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1807–08 (2009).
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Circuit’s hard look doctrine and the State Farm dicta criteria for
invalidating agency action.
While enforcing the statutory ban on broadcasting “any . . .
indecent . . . language,”170 the FCC had taken the position that it would
not penalize broadcasters who aired a fleeting expletive—the nonliteral
use of language describing sexual or excretory activities, which was also
not “deliberate [or] repetitive.”171 More simply, the FCC had not
penalized the broadcasting of a single use of the “F-Word” or “S-Word”
that was made in passing.172 In 2004, the FCC changed its position and
stated that it would start penalizing the broadcasting of fleeting
expletives.173 The agency explicitly acknowledged and overruled its
prior position.174 In supporting this change, the FCC explained that “any
use of [the F-Word] . . . inherently has a sexual connotation,” such that
the word is “patently offensive” because “[i]ts use invariably invokes a
coarse sexual image.”175 The agency also stated that categorical
exemptions for fleeting expletives would “likely lead to more
widespread use,” and technological advances had made it easier to
“bleep out” single uses of vulgar words.176 In 2006, the FCC issued an
order finding that Fox Television Stations had broadcast indecent
language by airing two different programs that both included fleeting
expletives.177 The agency further explained that its pre-2004 position on
fleeting expletives “d[id] not make sense in light of the fact that an
‘expletive’s’ power to offend derives from its sexual or excretory
meaning.”178 And the FCC noted that an exemption for fleeting
expletives “‘unfairly forces viewers (including children)’ to take ‘the
first blow’ and would allow broadcasters ‘to air expletives at all hours of
Nevertheless, Fox Television still addressed the APA arbitrary and capricious standard that applies
to agency rulemaking, including informal rulemaking.
170. 18 U.S.C. § 1464.
171. Fox Television, 129 S. Ct. at 1807.
172. Id. at 1806–08.
173. Id. at 1807 (citing In re Complaints Against Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding Their
Airing of the “Golden Globe Awards” Program, 19 FCC Rcd. 4975, 4975–76 (2004) [hereinafter
Golden Globes Order]).
174. Id. at 1808.
175. Id. at 1807–08 (quoting Golden Globes Order, 19 FCC Rcd. at 4978, 4979).
176. Id. at 1808 (quoting Golden Globes Order, 19 FCC Rcd. at 4979, 4980).
177. Id. at 1808–09 (citing In re Complaints Regarding Various Television Broads. Between
February 2, 2002, and March 8, 2005, 21 FCC Rcd. 13,299 (2006) [hereinafter Remand Order]).
178. Id. at 1809 (quoting Remand Order, 21 FCC Rcd. at 13,308).
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a day so long as they did so one at a time.’”179
In a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court held that the FCC’s change in
position regarding fleeting expletives was not arbitrary or capricious
under the APA.180 More importantly, the Court implicitly rejected the
State Farm dicta criteria for invalidating agency action. Neither Justice
Scalia’s majority opinion nor Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion ever
mentioned the State Farm dicta criteria for invalidating agency action,
and both opinions adopted quite limited readings of State Farm. Justice
Scalia explained that an agency’s change in position is not subjected to
more heightened review than an agency acting in the first instance,181
and that State Farm “said only” that an agency’s rescission of a prior
regulation was reviewable (unlike an agency’s decision not to act in the
first instance).182 Justice Kennedy, who provided the fifth vote for the
Fox Television majority, even limited State Farm to cases involving an
agency that made prior factual findings.183 Consequently, the majority
quoted State Farm merely for the proposition that APA arbitrary and
capricious review is “narrow,” it requires an agency to “examine the
relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action,” and
it does not allow a court “to substitute its judgment for that of the
agency.”184
Adding additional support for the proposition that the majority
implicitly rejected the State Farm dicta criteria, Justice Breyer’s dissent
quoted the State Farm dicta185 and would have invalidated the FCC’s
change in position on the basis that the agency failed to “consider . . .
179. Id. (quoting Remand Order, 21 FCC Rcd. at 13,309).
180. Id. at 1819.
181. See id. at 1810 (“State Farm neither held nor implied that every agency action representing a
policy change must be justified by reasons more substantial than those required to adopt a policy in
the first instance.”).
182. Id.
183. See id. at 1824 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (arguing
State Farm articulated the principle that “an agency’s decision to change course may be arbitrary
and capricious if the agency ignores or countermands its earlier factual findings without reasoned
explanation for doing so” (emphasis added)); see also id. at 1811 (majority opinion) (“This means
that the agency need not always provide a more detailed justification than what would suffice for a
new policy created on a blank slate. Sometimes it must—when, for example, its new policy rests
upon factual findings that contradict those which underlay its prior policy; or when its prior policy
has engendered serious reliance interests that must be taken into account.” (emphasis added)).
184. Id. at 1810 (majority opinion) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).
185. Id. at 1832 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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important aspect[s] of the problem.”186 Justice Breyer’s dissent would
have required the agency to address (1) “the First-Amendment-related
need to avoid ‘censorship’” because the “FCC had explicitly rested its
prior policy in large part upon the need to avoid treading too close to the
constitutional line,”187 and (2) the “potential impact of its new policy
upon local broadcasting coverage.”188 Additionally, Justice Breyer
would not have accepted the reasons that the FCC did give for its change
in position (these expletives “always invoke a coarse excretory or sexual
image,”189 viewers would suffer the “first blow,”190 and broadcasters
could air expletives at all hours “so long as they did so one at a time”191),
because the FCC would have been aware of all these rationales “the first
time around” when it adopted its initial policy.192
Unlike Justice Breyer, the majority did not treat the State Farm dicta
as an obstacle to upholding the agency’s action. In the portion of Justice
Scalia’s opinion that was not joined by Justice Kennedy, the plurality
responded to Justice Breyer’s arguments based on the State Farm dicta,
but the plurality never cited the State Farm dicta approvingly.193 Justice
Kennedy’s concurring opinion completely ignored the State Farm dicta
by not even addressing these arguments made by Justice Breyer.194 The
fact that Justice Kennedy, who provided the dispositive fifth vote, did
not even address the arguments premised on the State Farm dicta criteria
confirms that Fox Television implicitly rejected the State Farm dicta
criteria.
In addition to implicitly rejecting the State Farm dicta criteria, Fox
Television also implicitly rejected the D.C Circuit’s hard look doctrine.
The majority did acknowledge “the requirement that an agency provide
reasoned explanation for its action,”195 but the majority’s analysis
clarified that its idea of “reasoned explanation”196 required much less
186. Id. (quoting State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43).
187. Id. at 1833.
188. Id. at 1835.
189. Id. at 1838.
190. Id. at 1812 (quoting Remand Order, 21 FCC Rcd. 13,299, 13,309 (2006)).
191. Id. at 1839 (quoting Remand Order, 21 FCC Rcd. at 13,309).
192. Id. at 1838.
193. Id. at 1815–19 (plurality opinion).
194. Id. at 1822–24 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
195. Id. at 1811 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
196. Id.
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than the “reasoned decision-making” contemplated by the D.C. Circuit’s
hard look doctrine.197 Recall that the substantive hard look doctrine
required courts to scrutinize the record intensively,198 and the quasiprocedural hard look doctrine required agencies to use additional
procedures to produce better explanations.199 Instead of intensively
scrutinizing the record, the Fox Television majority simply asked
whether the agency’s reasons were “rational.”200 The majority did not
force the agency to use additional procedures to produce a better
explanation. Indeed, the majority did not require the agency “to adduce
empirical data” when that data could not readily be obtained201 or when
“the agency’s predictive judgment . . . makes entire sense.”202
Ultimately, APA arbitrary and capricious review after Fox Television
simply asks whether the agency’s reasons were “rational”—it does not
require courts to take a hard look at agency action or go through the
State Farm dicta criteria for invalidating agency action.203 Additionally,
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion confirms that the agency itself
still must provide the explanation, as Chenery required. Justice Kennedy
explained that the APA imposes “the duty of agencies to find and
formulate policies that can be justified by neutral principles and a
reasoned explanation.”204 The “duty of agencies” language confirms the
Chenery principle that the agency itself must provide the explanation, as
opposed to allowing courts to come with hypothetical explanations after
the fact. In fact, when Justice Kennedy quoted Overton Park for the
proposition that APA arbitrary and capricious review is “searching and
careful,” he was distinguishing administrative agencies’ unique

197. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Leventhal, J.);
see supra notes 103–104 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 103–107 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 98–101 and accompanying text.
200. Fox Television, 129 S. Ct. at 1812–13; see id. at 1812 (“It was certainly reasonable to
determine that it made no sense to distinguish between literal and nonliteral uses of offensive
words . . . .”); id. at 1812–13 (“It is surely rational (if not inescapable) to believe that a safe harbor
for single words would ‘likely lead to more widespread use of the offensive language.’” (quoting
Golden Globes Order, 19 FCC Rcd. 4975, 4979 (2004))); id. at 1813 (“The Commission could
rationally decide it needed to step away from its old regime . . . .”).
201. Id. at 1813
202. Id. at 1814
203. Id. at 1812–13.
204. Id. at 1822–23 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (emphasis
added).
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“constitutional position” compared to Congress,205 whose acts are only
reviewed for minimum rationality, meaning that Congress itself does not
have to provide an explanation for its action.
Lower courts could start seizing on Justice Kennedy’s “neutral and
rational principles” language to establish yet another hook for infusing
their policy preferences into APA arbitrary and capricious review, but
that would be a gross over-reading of Justice Kennedy’s concurrence.206
Justice Kennedy signed on to the majority opinion that merely required
the agency’s explanation to be “rational,”207 calling the majority’s
discussion a “careful and complete analysis.”208 Just as Justice Rehnquist
had noted in State Farm,209 Justice Kennedy explained that the agency’s
explanation in Fox Television was sufficient even though it was “not so
precise, detailed, or elaborate as to be a model for agency
explanation.”210
Fox Television significantly reduces the ability of courts to impose
their policy preferences on agencies and to invalidate agency action.
However, because the majority did not establish a doctrine underlying
APA arbitrary and capricious review and Justice Kennedy did not sign
on to the entire majority opinion, lower courts may still have difficulties
in applying Fox Television. The Supreme Court and lower courts may
very well have to articulate a comprehensive, thorough doctrine for APA
arbitrary and capricious review before courts stop using their policy
preferences to invalidate agency rulemaking.
II.

COURTS REVIEWING AGENCY RULEMAKING SHOULD
USE THE DOCTRINES FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
LEGISLATION

Before Fox Television, the law on arbitrary and capricious review was
in shambles and had given judges too much leeway to impose their

205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 1812–13 (majority opinion).
208. Id. at 1824 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
209. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 58 (1983)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the agency’s explanation was
sufficient even though it was “by no means a model”).
210. Fox Television, 129 S. Ct. at 1824 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
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policy preferences on agencies. That was largely due to the fact that
courts had not recognized the principles underlying their review of
agency rulemaking and they stopped using the doctrines for judicial
review of legislation when reviewing agency rulemaking. Essentially,
when courts recognized that agency rulemaking differed in significant
respects from legislation,211 they went too far in severing the connection
between the doctrines for review of agency rulemaking and
legislation.212 Without a theoretical grounding, arbitrary and capricious
review of agency rulemaking became highly politicized. The most direct
remedy for this problem is doctrinal innovations that will limit the
ability of judges to use their policy preferences to invalidate agency
rules.213
While Fox Television provided guidance to courts regarding what
they cannot do, there is still a void as to what doctrine or underlying
principles courts should use in conducting APA arbitrary and capricious
review. This Article argues that, after Fox Television, courts should
place APA arbitrary and capricious review on the tiers-of-scrutiny
sliding scale used for review of legislation, even though courts should
not equate arbitrary and capricious review with the minimum rationality
test used for reviewing most legislation. The significant differences
between agency rulemaking and legislation do warrant a more nuanced
doctrine than merely treating agency rulemaking as the equivalent of
legislation.214 This observation, though, does not entail an either-or
proposition: Courts can—and should—develop doctrines for judicial
review of agency rulemaking by using doctrines for review of
legislation, even if courts should not treat agency rulemaking as the
equivalent of legislation.
This Part begins with background information on the tiers of scrutiny,
which is the current doctrine for judicial review of legislation. It then
proceeds to give both practical and theoretical reasons why arbitrary and
211. See supra Part I.B.
212. See supra Part I.C.
213. See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Depoliticizing Administrative Law 24 (Univ. of
Chicago Pub. Law Working Paper No. 223, Univ. of Chicago John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working
Paper No. 143, Harvard Pub. Law Working Paper No. 08-16, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1150404 (“And if arbitrariness review is being conducted in a way that
shows a significant effect from judicial policy preferences, then the most obvious response would be
to reduce the intensity of such review. What is now a ‘hard look’ on the part of reviewing courts
might be transformed into a ‘soft look.’”).
214. See supra notes 52–67 and accompanying text.
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capricious review should be tied to the tiers of scrutiny. Practically,
arbitrary and capricious review under State Farm has left lower courts in
disarray and has politicized judicial review of agency rulemaking.
Theoretically, the Supreme Court is signaling that the APA’s arbitrary
and capricious standard should be interpreted as it was understood by
Congress when it passed the APA. This would entail a return to Pacific
States Box’s focus on an agency’s purpose in regulating and the means
used to achieve that purpose, even if agency rulemaking is not treated as
the equivalent as legislation. The doctrines for review of legislation
already provide a nuanced framework—based on over a century of trialand-error—for evaluating the purpose and means used in creating
legislative-like pronouncements.
A.

The Tiers of Scrutiny for Reviewing Legislation

It is settled constitutional law that judicial review of legislation is
based on the tiers of scrutiny, but it took over a century to solidify the
precedent underlying the tiers of scrutiny. The tiers of scrutiny require
courts to analyze the means and the ends of legislation by asking
whether the governmental purpose rises to the requisite level (the ends)
and whether the legislation has the requisite connection to that purpose
(the means).215 Currently, the Court recognizes three different levels of
scrutiny.216 In determining which level of scrutiny to use, courts look to
various factors: the original understanding of the Constitution,217 the
institutional competence of courts to second-guess legislatures,218
whether courts in future cases would be required to apply heightened
scrutiny in an unprincipled manner that would open a “Pandora’s
box,”219 whether a deficiency in the political process exists,220 and
215. See Shapiro & Levy, supra note 59, at 425 (Under the tiers of scrutiny, courts analyze “the
rationality of legislative purposes and means chosen to achieve them.”).
216. See R. Randall Kelso, Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Clause and Related
Constitutional Doctrines Protecting Individual Rights: The “Base Plus Six” Model and Modern
Supreme Court Practice, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 225, 225–26 (2002) (“[T]raditional black-letter law
continues to discuss three basic standards of review—minimum rationality review, intermediate or
mid-level review, and strict scrutiny . . . .”). See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 529 (Aspen Law & Bus. Publishers 1997).
217. See Kelso, supra note 216, at 229 n.19 (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194
(1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)).
218. See id. (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 443 (1985)).
219. Id. (citing City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 445–46).
220. See id. at 229 n.20 (citing United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
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whether the legislation affects an immutable characteristic221 or “burdens
an individual for something not the product of that individual’s
choice.”222
A small proportion of legislation will be reviewed under “strict
scrutiny,” which requires that the legislation serve a compelling
governmental purpose and be narrowly tailored to serve that purpose.223
Strict scrutiny applies to “[c]lassifications based on race or national
origin and classifications affecting fundamental rights.”224
“Intermediate scrutiny” is more deferential to legislation than strict
scrutiny, but courts can still easily invalidate legislation under this
standard. Under intermediate scrutiny, the legislation must serve an
important governmental purpose and be substantially related to that
purpose.225 Intermediate scrutiny applies to content-neutral restrictions
of speech,226 classifications based on illegitimacy,227 and classifications
based on sex.228
“Rational basis” review is the most deferential doctrine for reviewing
legislation, as it merely requires that the legislation has a legitimate
governmental purpose and is rationally related to that purpose.229 Unlike
strict and intermediate scrutiny, the Supreme Court has held that courts
reviewing legislation for a rational basis can consider any conceivable,
hypothetical governmental purpose that the legislature could have had in
mind;230 this approach to rational basis review has become known as
(1938)).
221. See id. (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973)).
222. Id. (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982)).
223. See, e.g., Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 82 (1997) (describing “strict scrutiny” as
requiring legislation to be “narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest”).
224. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (citation omitted). See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973) (applying strict scrutiny to the fundamental right of privacy); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967) (applying strict scrutiny to racial classifications).
225. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (stating that intermediate scrutiny
requires the legislation to “serve important governmental objectives and . . . be substantially related
to achievement of those objectives”).
226. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994).
227. See, e.g., Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 98–99 (1982).
228. See, e.g., Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
229. See, e.g., Lyng v. Int’l Union, 485 U.S. 360, 370 n.8 (1988) (explaining that the “rationalbasis test” requires legislation to be “rationally related to any legitimate governmental objective”).
230. See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313–15 (1993) (stating that courts
could consider any “conceivable” purpose under rational basis review, and “because we never
require a legislature to articulate its reasons for enacting a statute, it is entirely irrelevant for
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“minimum rationality” review.231 Most legislation will be reviewed for a
rational basis, as anything not triggering strict or intermediate scrutiny is
subject to rational basis review.232
While the Supreme Court has only articulated these three levels of
scrutiny,233 many commentators have suggested that there are really
other levels of scrutiny for reviewing legislation.234 Most importantly,
the Court’s precedents suggest a heightened variant of rational basis
review, which this Article will call “rational basis with bite.”235 Under
rational basis with bite, courts use the rational basis standard, which
examines whether the purpose is legitimate and the means are rationally
related to that purpose.236 Rational basis with bite, however, does not
adopt the minimum rationality approach that examines any conceivable,
hypothetical purposes237—rather, rational basis with bite only examines
the actual purpose motivating the legislature, as evidenced by the record
created by the legislature.238

constitutional purposes whether the conceived reason for the challenged distinction actually
motivated the legislature”).
231. See Kelso, supra note 216, at 230 (describing “minimum rationality” review as examining
any “conceivable legitimate interest to support the statute”).
232. See Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 313 (“In areas of social and economic policy, a statutory
classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional
rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state
of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.”).
233. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2821 (2008) (stating that the three
“traditionally expressed levels” of scrutiny are “strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, [and] rational
basis”).
234. See, e.g., Kelso, supra note 216, at 226 (arguing that the Supreme Court should recognize
seven levels of scrutiny, but that the Court has applied ten different levels of scrutiny). The other
levels of scrutiny proposed by Kelso are hybrid standards that use portions of the intermediate
scrutiny standard and portions of the strict scrutiny standard. See id. at 258 (“Appendix”). As this
Article ultimately rejects applying intermediate or strict scrutiny, it will not consider the hybrid
variations based on those two levels of scrutiny.
235. The term rational basis “with bite” stems from its use by Gerald Gunther in Foreword: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARV. L. REV. 1, 21 (1972). Gunther explained that the Court could put “new bite into the old equal
protection” by not “supply[ing] justifying rationales by exercising its imagination.” Id.; see also
GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 486-87 (16th ed., Foundation Press 2007)
(discussing rational basis with bite); see generally infra note 238.
236. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
237. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
238. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985) (“[T]he record
does not reveal any rational basis . . . .”); see, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632–35 (1996)
(examining the actual legislative purpose instead of creating a hypothetical, conceivable purpose);
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The Court has not yet recognized the existence of rational basis with
bite, much less defined when rational basis with bite applies instead of
minimum rationality in the context of reviewing legislation.239 Generally
speaking, rational basis with bite has applied in cases with two features:
(1) they involve a classification to which the Court does not want lower
courts applying intermediate or strict scrutiny, given institutional
competence concerns and the fear of opening a Pandora’s box;240 (2) but
the law at issue nevertheless blatantly “burdens an individual for
something not the product of that individual’s choice.”241 In other words,
rational basis with bite has been applied when there was both a plausible
argument for applying heightened scrutiny and also reasons for the Court
to worry about subjecting the law at issue to heightened scrutiny—that
is, because lower courts could over-use their power of judicial review to
strike down other pieces of legislation that the Court would consider
valid.242
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 207 (1982) (same); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 535,
538 (1973) (same); see also U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 188 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (“A challenged classification may be sustained only if it is rationally related to
achievement of an actual legitimate governmental purpose.”); Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v.
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1194 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc), rev’d 551 U.S. 701 (2007)
(Kozinski, J., concurring) (“By rational basis, I don’t mean the standard applied to economic
regulations, where courts shut their eyes to reality or even invent justifications for upholding
government programs, but robust and realistic rational basis review, where courts consider the
actual reasons for the plan in light of the real-world circumstances that gave rise to it.” (citations
omitted)). See generally Neelum J. Wadhwani, Note, Rational Reviews, Irrational Results, 84 TEX.
L. REV. 801, 803, 814–15 (2006) (explaining “the Court’s schizophrenic oscillation” between
minimum rationality and rational basis with bite).
239. Some commentators have questioned whether courts can justifiably look to Congress’s
legislative record in determining the constitutionality of a statute. See, e.g., A. Christopher Bryant &
Timothy J. Simeone, Remanding to Congress: The Supreme Court’s New “On the Record” Review
of Federal Statutes, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 328, 375 (2001); William W. Buzbee & Robert A.
Schapiro, Legislative Record Review, 54 STAN L. REV. 87, 140 (2001).
240. See Kelso, supra note 216, at 229 n.19 (citing City of Cleburne, 437 U.S. at 443, 445–46).
241. Id. at 229 n.20 (citing Plyler at 220); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003)
(O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating that rational basis with bite applies “[w]hen a
law exhibits . . . a desire to harm a politically unpopular group” (citing Romer, 517 U.S. at 632; City
of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446–47; Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534)).
242. In the context of criminal sentencing, federal courts of appeals may very well be treating
district courts as if they were expert “agencies,” ever since the Supreme Court found that the
mandatory Sentencing Guidelines were unconstitutional. Courts of appeals now essentially apply a
rational basis with bite standard to appellate review of a district court’s sentence that is outside the
Sentencing Guidelines range. Congress has required district courts to give a written explanation for
all sentences given outside the Guidelines range. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2). The courts of appeals then
review this explanation and the sentence under a reasonableness standard. See United States v.
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B.

Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking Should Be Based on the
Tiers of Scrutiny

It took the Court over a century to solidify the tiers of scrutiny243
because the development of doctrines for review of legislative-like
pronouncements needed to account for many factors, including the
institutional competence of courts to review policy decisions made by
governmental bodies entrusted with such decisions. One large limitation
inherent in the tiers of scrutiny is that courts can only evaluate the
purpose and means of a piece of legislation. Courts, for example, cannot
require Congress to hold more hearings or examine different aspects of
the underlying problem. Similar concerns regarding institutional
competence surround judicial review of agency rulemaking, as unelected
judges are reviewing the policy decisions made by the government body
entrusted with making such decisions.
However, rather than acknowledge and take advantage of the “[y]ears
of refinement” that went into creating the tiers of scrutiny,244 the Court
has not considered the use of the tiers of scrutiny to address these
concerns regarding judicial review of agency rulemaking. Courts have
not been limiting themselves to reviewing the agency’s purpose in
regulating and the means used to achieve that purpose. Rather, State
Farm’s dicta established a vague, open-ended list of criteria that
essentially gives courts carte blanche to validate or invalidate agency
rules.245 The courts of appeals have cited these State Farm criteria

Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261–62 (2005). In fact, the same dispute in administrative law regarding how
to define procedural versus substantive requirements, see supra notes 119–123 and accompanying
text, is arising in the context of determining whether a criminal sentence should be reviewed as
being “procedurally” versus “substantive[ly] reasonable[],” Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586,
597 (2007). Compare Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2473 (2007) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(stating that an explanation for a sentence based on disliking Yankees fans would go to substantive
reasonableness), with id. at 2483 n.6 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(stating that such an explanation would go to procedural reasonableness).
243. See supra note 43.
244. Charles Fried, The Artificial Reason of the Law or: What Lawyers Know, 60 TEX. L. REV.
35, 40 (1981); see id. (discussing the process by which the common law refines legal doctrines over
many years in the context of contract and tort law).
245. See Paul R. Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking: Waiting for Vermont Yankee
II, 55 TUL. L. REV. 418, 419–21 (1981) (arguing that the Court should prevent courts from
invalidating agency rules because of minor gaps or defects in the agency’s reasoning for the same
reasons articulated in Vermont Yankee).
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hundreds of times.246 While Fox Television took a step in the right
direction by eliminating these State Farm criteria, it did not place the
standard for reviewing agency rulemaking on the tiers-of-scrutiny
sliding scale. For both practical and theoretical reasons, courts should
take this additional step and place the APA’s arbitrary and capricious
standard on the tiers-of-scrutiny sliding scale.
Practically, the lower courts’ application of the APA’s arbitrary and
capricious standard has proven that its doctrine for review of agency
rulemaking is unprincipled and unmanageable. Within a decade after
State Farm and Chevron, “the Chevron framework [had] broken down,
and State Farm [had] been all but ignored by agencies and the courts,
including the Supreme Court.”247 At times, the Supreme Court and the
courts of appeals cite the State Farm criteria in applying the arbitrary
and capricious standard, but the criteria are more often ignored.248 At the
other extreme, the D.C. Circuit continues to use its hard look doctrine,249
although it often hides this fact by not using the magic words “hard
look” in invalidating agency action.250 Other circuits, as well, have
routinely invoked the hard look doctrine.251 Confirming the disarray,
246. A simple Westlaw search on July 8, 2009, just for the phrase “failed to consider an
important aspect of the problem,” State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43, returned 300 cases in the federal
courts of appeals.
247. Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy in Substantive
Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1051, 1051–52 (1995).
248. Id. at 1067.
249. See, e.g., El Conejo Americano of Texas, Inc. v. DOT, 278 F.3d 17, 19–20 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(invoking the “hard look” standard under arbitrary and capricious review).
250. See, e.g., Am. Radio Relay League, Inc. v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 241 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“[T]he
Commission offered no reasoned explanation for its dismissal of empirical data that was submitted
at its invitation.”).
251. See, e.g., Long Island Head Start Child Dev. Servs. v. NLRB, 460 F.3d 254, 257 (2d Cir.
2006) (“applying State Farm ‘hard look’ standard to NLRB adjudication”); Citizens Coal Council v.
EPA, 447 F.3d 879, 914 (6th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (Martin, J., dissenting) (“In conducting our
review, we ‘intervene not merely in case of procedural inadequacies, or bypassing of the mandate in
the legislative charter, but more broadly if the court becomes aware, especially from a combination
of danger signals, that the agency has not really taken a ‘hard look’ at the salient problems, and has
not genuinely engaged in reasoned decision-making.’” (quoting Greater Boston Television Corp. v.
FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851–52 (D.C. Cir. 1970))); Simms v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 45
F.3d 999, 1004 (6th Cir. 1995) (“Rather the court must ‘ensure that the agency took a “hard look” at
all relevant issues and considered reasonable alternatives . . . .’” (quoting Neighborhood TV Co.,
Inc. v. FCC, 742 F.2d 629, 639 (D.C. Cir. 1984))); Frisby v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 755
F.2d 1052, 1055 (3d Cir. 1985) (“This presumption does not, however, prevent a reviewing court
from taking a probing, ‘hard look’ at the agency’s action.”); Citizens State Bank of Marshfield, Mo.
v. FDIC, 718 F.2d 1440, 1445 (8th Cir. 1983) (“We are not satisfied that the Board took a ‘hard
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lower courts often selectively quote from Overton Park or State Farm
for the proposition that arbitrary and capricious review is either
“narrow” or more “probing”—but not both.252 D.C. Circuit Judge
Kavanaugh may have summed it up best:
Courts have incrementally expanded those APA [§ 553]
procedural requirements well beyond what the text provides.
And courts simultaneously have grown State Farm’s “narrow” §
706 arbitrary-and-capricious review into a far more demanding
test. Application of the beefed-up arbitrary-and-capricious test is
inevitably if not inherently unpredictable—so much so that, on
occasion, the courts’ arbitrary-and-capricious review itself
appears arbitrary and capricious.253
Chevron did not fare much better. Most lower courts interpreted
Chevron as a return to minimum rationality review in cases involving
agency statutory interpretation,254 although a significant number of D.C.
look’ at the relevant issues . . . .” (citing Greater Boston, 444 F.2d at 852–53)). But see Nw. Envtl.
Def. Ctr. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 477 F.3d 668, 687 n.15 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Because the
Supreme Court has never explicitly embraced the ‘hard look’ approach to judicial review under the
arbitrary and capricious standard of the APA, we adhere to the Supreme Court’s explicit guidance in
State Farm that an agency must cogently explain its actions and demonstrate a rational connection
between the facts it found and the choice it made.” (citation omitted)).
252. A quick search on Westlaw in December 2008 revealed that Overton Park was cited 1642
times in the federal courts of appeals. Eight hundred seventeen times, the court quoted Overton Park
for the proposition that arbitrary and capricious review is narrow or that the court could not
substitute its judgment for the agency’s judgment—but did not state that this review was thorough,
probing, or in-depth. The opposite happened 107 times. The search was limited to federal courts of
appeals cases citing Overton Park, and the locate terms of the search were <narrow substitute %
(thorough probing in-depth)>. Similarly, State Farm was cited 1149 times in the federal courts of
appeals. Three hundred eighty-three times, the court quoted State Farm for the proposition that
arbitrary and capricious review is narrow or that the court could not substitute its judgment for the
agency’s judgment—but did not list the State Farm criteria for invalidating agency action, thus
failing to indicate that review is also “probing.” The opposite happened 134 times. The search was
limited to federal courts of appeals cases citing State Farm, and the locate terms of the search were
<narrow substitute % (“rel! on factors” “fail! to consider” “counter to the evidence”
“implausible”)>. Fox Television may have settled that State Farm stands for “narrow” but not
“probing” review, though, as the majority quoted State Farm for the proposition that arbitrary and
capricious review is “narrow” without quoting State Farm for the proposition that it is also probing.
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. __ (Apr. 28, 2009), 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1810 (2009).
253. Am. Radio Relay League, Inc. v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 248 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
254. See Levin, supra note 156, at 1266 n.59 (“[U]nder current law step two is so deferential as to
be almost inconsequential . . . .” (citing Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing
Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83, 96
(1994))).
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Circuit cases infused the hard look doctrine into Chevron255 by
continuing to equivocate on the term “reasonable.”256 However, to
compound the ambiguity, the Supreme Court’s recent Chevron Step
Zero doctrine reduced Chevron deference through factors that look a lot
like the D.C. Circuit’s hard look doctrine.257
Empirical studies confirm that under State Farm and Chevron, the
political policy preferences of judges significantly affects whether
judges invalidate agency action.258 With such a muddled doctrine, this
comes as no surprise, as there was leeway to apply individual policy
preferences under indeterminate doctrines. Nevertheless, much of the
commentary supporting the hard look doctrine and State Farm’s dicta
has taken it on faith that judges would not let their political policy
preferences cloud their judgments.259 Evidence to the contrary confirms
that the Supreme Court was right in Fox Television to implicitly
eliminate both the State Farm dicta criteria for invalidating agency
action and the D.C. Circuit’s hard look doctrine. Indeed, the major
reason why Congress creates agencies is so that an expert set of
decisionmakers—not judges—can set national policy.260 When judges
overrule expert agencies because of judicial policy preferences, they

255. See id. at 1263 (“An important line of cases from the D.C. Circuit has implemented step two
of the Chevron test through lines of argument that originated in abuse of discretion doctrine, often
under banners such as ‘reasoned decisionmaking’ or the judicial ‘hard look.’”).
256. See id. (“In effect, the [D.C. Circuit] has transformed the Chevron step two question of
whether the agency action was ‘reasonable’ into a question of whether it was ‘reasoned.’”).
257. See Keller, supra note 57, at 67–69 (discussing Chevron Step Zero and explaining that
Chevron deference could be rejected if the agency lacked expertise, changed positions, did not
carefully consider the relevant issues, or was addressing an important issue) (citing Gonzales v.
Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 267–68 (2006); Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002); United States
v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001); Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000)).
258. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
259. See, e.g., Garland, supra note 47, at 558 (“[H]ard look review may be too hard because it
may permit a court to substitute its judgment for the agency’s on the pretext of determining whether
a policy outcome is ‘reasonable.’ . . . It is hard to rebut this charge directly, beyond asserting the
good faith of the judiciary.”); Shapiro & Levy, supra note 59, at 438 (“It would, of course, be naive
to suppose that [substantive hard look] can completely avoid the problem of judges finding flaws in
agency reasoning because they dislike the result.”).
260. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984)
(“Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political branch of the Government.
Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing political interests, but not on the basis of the
judges’ personal policy preferences. In contrast, an agency to which Congress has delegated policymaking responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent
administration’s views of wise policy to inform its judgments.”).
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eliminate the major advantage of having an administrative state in the
first place.
After Fox Television, these practical concerns about an unworkable
doctrine for APA arbitrary and capricious review may disappear. But
because the Supreme Court did not explicitly eliminate the State Farm
criteria or the hard look doctrine and because lower courts could
misinterpret Justice Kennedy’s Fox Television concurrence,261 lower
courts might continue invalidating agency action based on their policy
preferences. If so, the Supreme Court or lower courts will need to adopt
a more robust doctrine, such as application of the tiers of scrutiny, that
limits what criteria courts can look to, instead of merely setting a few
examples on how to perform APA arbitrary and capricious review.
In addition to these practical concerns, there are theoretical reasons
for placing APA arbitrary and capricious review of agency rulemaking
on the tiers of scrutiny. Most importantly, courts need to return to
focusing solely on the agency’s purpose in regulating and the means
used by the agency to achieve that purpose. There is statutory support in
the APA for this: APA Section 553, which establishes the procedures
agencies must use during informal rulemaking, provides that the
agency’s record only needs to include a “concise general statement of
[the rule’s] basis and purpose.”262 When courts are given the leeway to
require that agencies use additional procedures to formulate a more
lengthy record for appellate review, judges can use their policy
preferences to invalidate agency rulemaking under the guise of merely
asking for a more thorough record. However, the ability of judges to use
their policy preferences in reviewing agency rulemaking would be
significantly constrained if judges could only examine the agency’s
explanation about its purpose and means. Such an inquiry would focus
simply on whether the agency invoked a regulatory purpose contained
within its statutory delegation and whether the agency adequately
explained how the rule it promulgated was sufficiently connected to that
purpose.
The hard look doctrine itself was basically “a surrogate for motivation
analysis”263—that is, an analysis of the agency’s purpose to see whether

261. See supra notes 206–210 and accompanying text.
262. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2006) (emphasis added).
263. Garland, supra note 47, at 555.
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an “improper motive has intruded into the decisionmaking process.”264
Courts’ main concern in reviewing agency rulemaking is the agency’s
purpose, so the doctrines for judicial review of agency rulemaking
should be simplified to focus directly on the agency’s purpose instead of
proxies that do not necessarily implicate that purpose. Using the tiers of
scrutiny in reviewing agency rulemaking would restore this direct focus
on the agency’s purpose in rulemaking.
Another theoretical concern is that courts applying the State Farm
criteria and the D.C. Circuit’s hard look doctrine neglected to justify
their doctrines for judicial review of agency rulemaking, as did the
Supreme Court in Fox Television.265 There was no limiting principle to
the D.C. Circuit’s requirement that courts give agency action a hard
look—a hard look requirement can result in any outcome that a judge
wants. Similarly, State Farm’s adoption in dicta of a non-exhaustive list
of criteria for invalidating agency action allowed lower courts to
overrule agencies whenever an agency “failed to consider” something
that a court deemed to be “an important aspect of the problem.”266 Fox
Television is a big improvement, but its fact-specific example of how to
conduct APA arbitrary and capricious review could easily be
distinguished by lower courts—even though Fox Television’s particular
example of arbitrary and capricious review shows just how restrained
courts must be when reviewing agency rulemaking. The tiers of scrutiny,
though, provide judicial standards employed by courts in many other
contexts, such as an objective reasonableness standard under rational
basis review. One of the greatest advantages of adopting a tiers-ofscrutiny approach to reviewing agency rulemaking is that courts could
take advantage of cross-doctrinal precedents, which give content to the
various standards contained within the tiers of scrutiny.
Indeed, that is precisely what Congress was trying to do when it
codified the arbitrary and capricious standard in the APA. Courts had
been using the arbitrary and capricious standard in reviewing legislation,
so Congress wanted courts to use that same, deferential standard when
264. Id. at 553.
265. See Cross, supra note 13, at 1244 (“[T]he justification for some measure of [judicial review
of rulemaking] is widely taken for granted.”).
266. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983); see,
e.g., Ky. Waterways Alliance v. Johnson, 540 F.3d 466, 492 (6th Cir. 2008) (Cook, J., concurring);
CBS Corp. v. FCC, 535 F.3d 167, 195 n.25 (3d Cir. 2008); Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373
F.3d 372, 420–21 (3d Cir. 2004).

468

Keller_Article_DTPed[1].docx (Do Not Delete)

8/31/2009 7:40 PM

Depoliticizing Review of Rulemaking
reviewing agency action.267 This is extremely relevant to the modern
Supreme Court, which has explained that the APA should be interpreted
in accordance with the understanding of the APA when Congress passed
it in 1946.268 The modern Court’s shift to interpreting the APA in
accordance with the original understanding of the APA provides
substantial support for applying the tiers of scrutiny used for reviewing
legislation when reviewing agency rulemaking.
Thus, for both practical and theoretical reasons, courts should place
the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard on the tiers of scrutiny.
Courts reviewing agency rules would return to focusing solely on the
agency’s purpose in regulating and the means used to achieve that
purpose. Granted, there could still be some room for examining the
agency’s rulemaking record or second-guessing the agency’s ultimate
policy decision under a tiers-of-scrutiny approach to reviewing agency
rulemaking. However, the degree to which courts would be able to do
that depends on where arbitrary and capricious review is placed on the
tiers of scrutiny. The next Part will address that question. Regardless of
where arbitrary and capricious review is placed on the tiers of scrutiny,
the doctrines for reviewing legislation should be used in reviewing
agency rulemaking because they would significantly clarify and improve
the doctrines for reviewing agency rulemaking.
III.

COURTS REVIEWING AGENCY RULEMAKING UNDER
THE APA SHOULD USE THE RATIONAL BASIS WITH
BITE STANDARD

Ultimately, this Article argues that courts should equate APA
arbitrary and capricious review of agency rulemaking to the rational
basis with bite standard used in reviewing legislation,269 an approach that
267. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
268. See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 155 (1999) (“A statutory intent that legislative
departure from the norm must be clear suggests a need for similar clarity in respect to grandfathered
common-law variations. The APA was meant to bring uniformity to a field full of variation and
diversity.”); id. at 165 (“Congress has set forth the appropriate standard in the APA.”); Dir., Office
of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 275 (1994) (interpreting the
APA’s use of the term “burden of proof” in accordance with 1930s and 1940s sources, and
“presum[ing] Congress intended the phrase to have the meaning generally accepted in the legal
community at the time of enactment”).
269. This Article does not take a position on whether the rational basis with bite approach should
be used when reviewing informal adjudication or subformal rulemaking (e.g., rules made through
interpretive decisions or action letters—not through APA Section 553’s informal rulemaking
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is supported by the Court’s recent decision in FCC v. Fox Television
Stations, Inc. Under this rational basis with bite approach, courts would
ask (1) whether the agency’s rule conforms to a legitimate statutory
purpose and (2) whether the rule is rationally related to that purpose.270
Importantly, courts would not be permitted to examine any conceivable,
hypothetical statutory purposes, but only the actual purpose invoked by
the agency in the rulemaking record.271 This Part first provides an
argument for adopting rational basis with bite instead of the other
standards on the tiers of scrutiny.272 It then applies the rational basis with
bite approach to two recent court of appeals cases to show how the
standard can bring clarity to this area of the law, which has been “more
Rorschach than rule of law.”273
A.

Rational Basis with Bite Should be Used in Reviewing Agency
Rulemaking—Instead of Minimum Rationality, Intermediate
Scrutiny, or Strict Scrutiny

Equating APA arbitrary and capricious review of agency rulemaking
to the rational basis with bite approach has two primary advantages
compared to other levels of scrutiny: (1) it balances the justification for
heightened review of agency rulemaking with the need to limit judges’
procedures) under the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard.
270. See supra notes 235–238 and accompanying text.
271. Some commentators have argued that courts should also be able to examine reasons given
by the agency after the rulemaking process has finished (such as reasons provided during
subsequent litigation). See, e.g., Note, Rationalizing Hard Look Review After the Fact, 122 HARV.
L. REV. 1909, 1919 (2009). This argument is based primarily on the APA’s harmless (or prejudicial)
error standard. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006) (“[D]ue account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial
error.”). Other commentators, though, justify the requirement that an agency must provide reasons
in the rulemaking record as a means of providing some enforcement of the underenforced
nondelegation doctrine. See, e.g., Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116
YALE L.J. 952, 996–1000 (2009). This Article does not take a position on the precise timing of
when the agency must provide the reasons. Rather, it assumes, consistent with Chenery, that courts
can only examine the agency’s reasons that were made in the rulemaking record.
272. This Article does not take a position on whether adoption of this rational basis with bite
approach would overrule Chevron. As previously mentioned, Chevron created an exception from
the typical arbitrary and capricious standard of review applied under State Farm that applies when
courts review agencies’ interpretation of statutes that they are delegated to administer. See supra
notes 164–167 and accompanying text. Chevron could easily remain as an entrenched exception to
this rational basis with bite approach that applies when courts review agency statutory
interpretation.
273. Am. Radio Relay League, Inc. v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 247 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).

470

Keller_Article_DTPed[1].docx (Do Not Delete)

8/31/2009 7:40 PM

Depoliticizing Review of Rulemaking
abilities to use their policy preferences to invalidate agency rulemaking,
and (2) rational basis with bite fits comfortably within the Supreme
Court’s precedents on APA arbitrary and capricious review.
This first major advantage—adopting a standard that is not too
stringent yet not too lenient—is what motivated the Court to use rational
basis with bite in reviewing legislation. The Court did not want judges to
have the latitude to strike down much legislation, but it believed
minimum rationality review was too lenient.274 Minimum rationality
review and strict scrutiny—the two extreme standards for reviewing
legislation—can therefore be eliminated easily as inappropriate
standards for review of agency rulemaking. The significant differences
between agencies and Congress, as well as the underenforced
nondelegation doctrine,275 provide a strong basis for subjecting agency
rulemaking to a more heightened standard than the minimum rationality
review used for reviewing most legislation.276 In fact, Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence in Fox Television made this observation in recognizing the
differences between Congress and agencies and noting that agencies
could not be given “unbridled discretion.”277 At the same time, under
strict scrutiny, judges would be even more likely to use their policy
preferences when reviewing agency rulemaking than they have been

274. See supra notes 240–241 and accompanying text.
275. See supra Part I.B; see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29, 43 n.9 (1983) (“The Department of Transportation suggests that the arbitrary-andcapricious standard requires no more than the minimum rationality a statute must bear under the
Due Process Clause. We do not view as equivalent the presumption of constitutionality afforded
legislation drafted by Congress and the presumption of regularity afforded an agency in fulfilling its
statutory mandate.”).
276. This, of course, would contradict Pacific States Box, which expressly equated agency
rulemaking with congressional legislation. See supra notes 45–51 and accompanying text. But the
courts are long past treating agency rulemaking the same as congressional legislation. See supra
Parts I.B, I.C. Moreover, in the same year that Pacific States Box was decided (1935), the Court
used the nondelegation doctrine twice to invalidate congressional delegations to agencies. A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 542 (1935); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,
293 U.S. 388, 433 (1935). Those are the only two times the Court has invoked the nondelegation
doctrine to invalidate congressional delegations of power. It is therefore unclear whether Pacific
State Box’s holding was premised on the view that the Court would be actively enforcing the
nondelegation doctrine, as the nondelegation doctrine could prevent Congress from delegating large
amounts of legislative power. Had the Pacific States Box Court known that the modern Court would
basically not enforce the nondelegation doctrine, Pacific States Box may very well have treated
agency rulemaking differently from legislation.
277. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. __ (Apr. 28, 2009), 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1823
(2009) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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under the State Farm dicta criteria. Even staunch advocates of reducing
deference to agencies would probably not evaluate agency rulemaking
under strict scrutiny, as that would imply that almost all agency action is
suspect and illegitimate.278
That, of course, leaves intermediate scrutiny as the alternative to
rational basis with bite. Under intermediate scrutiny, the Court would
also look at the agency’s actual statutory purposes; but instead of merely
requiring the agency’s rule to be rationally related to a legitimate
purpose, intermediate scrutiny would require the rule to be substantially
related to an important purpose. This more indeterminate phrasing of the
intermediate scrutiny standard would probably allow courts to retain the
D.C. Circuit’s hard look doctrine, which has resulted in unmanageable,
politicized doctrines for reviewing agency rulemaking. Tellingly, the
Supreme Court recently stated that intermediate scrutiny for reviewing
legislation required a “hard look.”279
Intermediate scrutiny would give courts at least as much leeway to
invalidate agency rulemaking as the D.C. Circuit’s hard look doctrine.
For example, if a statutory delegation contained more than one policy
directive, a court reviewing under intermediate scrutiny could favor one
policy over another—by stating that one statutory purpose was
important while another was not—and invalidate agency action that
relied on the less-favored policy. In fact, most delegations direct
agencies to do some form of cost-benefit analysis, so a reviewing court
could invalidate agency action on the grounds that the agency should
have given other, more important statutory purposes greater weight than
the agency gave to cost-benefit analysis.280 As another example, an
agency could promulgate a rule that sets a standard at a certain level.

278. Cf. Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petrol. Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 695 n.9 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (“There is also room for especially rigorous judicial scrutiny of agency decisions under a
rationale akin to that offered in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4
(1938).” (citing Envtl. Def. Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971))); Envtl. Def.
Fund, 439 F.2d at 598 (“[C]ourts are increasingly asked to review administrative action that touches
on fundamental personal interests in life, health, and liberty. These interests have always had a
special claim to judicial protection, in comparison with the economic interests at stake in a
ratemaking or licensing proceeding.”).
279. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 541 (1996).
280. But see John D. Graham, Saving Lives Through Administrative Law and Economics, 157 U.
PA. L. REV. 395, 403 (2008) (“My central argument is that [cost-benefit analysis], while easy to
criticize because of its transparency, has compelling philosophical and practical advantages over
other suggested approaches to lifesaving regulation.” (citation omitted)).
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Under intermediate scrutiny, a court could then find that the standard is
not stringent enough to qualify as substantially related to the important
statutory purpose relied upon.
It would be much harder to invalidate agency action under rational
basis with bite than under intermediate scrutiny. That is not to say that
rational basis with bite leaves no room for judges to invalidate agency
action: an agency’s rule must be rationally related to a legitimate
statutory purpose actually invoked by the agency. Judges could therefore
find the agency’s rule was not rationally related or the purpose was not
legitimate. The labels “rationally related” and “legitimate” are not rocksolid limitations that completely cabin the discretion of judges.
However, rational basis with bite does make it more difficult to
invalidate agency action. Any purpose contained in a statutory
delegation will be a legitimate governmental purpose. As long as the
agency invokes a purpose enumerated by the statute, courts will not be
able to invalidate agency action under the purpose prong of rational
basis with bite. And the rationally related prong implies a standard of
objective reasonableness, where a judge asks whether an objectively
reasonable person would be compelled to conclude that the agency rule
was not related to the statutory purpose.281 Judges can manipulate review
under an objective reasonableness standard, but it is much more difficult
to get away with erroneously calling a rule “irrational” than with
deciding that the agency’s purpose is not “important” or the rule is not
“substantially” related to that purpose.
The rational basis with bite standard is therefore important if for no
other reason than it can highlight when courts are egregiously
overstepping their mandate of conducting arbitrary and capricious
review without being swayed by judicial policy preferences. One of the
reasons the Supreme Court rarely addresses arbitrary and capricious
review is that, because there is no metric for determining when a judge
decides a case based on policy preferences, such cases are largely
insulated from review.282 The rational basis with bite doctrine will
281. Cf. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 & n.1 (1992).
282. See Scalia, supra note 34, at 372 (stating that agency rulemaking is largely insulated from
Supreme Court review because courts frequently offer “dicta, alternate holdings, and confused
holdings”); see also Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the
Supreme Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV.
1093, 1131 (1987) (“As long as the practice of hard-look review continues to be accepted, an
uncorrected lower court error of this dimension, however costly to the particular enterprise being
challenged, presents less of a claim on the Court’s limited resources.”).
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illuminate when courts of appeals let policy preferences dictate their
results, as it will require judges to employ an objective reasonableness
standard—and the Supreme Court is quite comfortable reviewing under
objective reasonableness standards.283
Moreover, the perceived stringency of the standard for reviewing
agency rulemaking affects whether agencies, ex ante, will choose to
engage in rulemaking in the first place. Before studies in the past decade
found that judges were infusing their policy preferences into arbitrary
and capricious review,284 the most cited argument against State Farm
was that it ossified rulemaking:285 Agencies would not engage in new
rulemaking and existing rules would never be changed because agencies
feared that the resources they would devote to the rulemaking would be
wasted if a court invalidated the rule.286 If all agency rulemaking were to
283. For example, the Supreme Court frequently uses an objective reasonableness standard in
reviewing state court judgments in Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) habeas
cases and Fourth Amendment search and seizure cases. See, e.g., Waddington v. Sarausad, 129 S.
Ct. 823, 831 (2009) (AEDPA habeas review); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 (2007) (Fourth
Amendment).
284. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
285. See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 225
(1990) (“The result of judicial requirements for comprehensive rationality has been a general
suppression of the use of rules.”); Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the
Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1386 (1992) (explaining that “many observers from across
the political spectrum” saw the “ossification” of the rulemaking process as “one of the most serious
problems . . . facing regulatory agencies”); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency
Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 66 (1995) (“Judicial ossification of rulemaking is a function of
two variables: (1) judicial imposition of decisionmaking procedures that are costly and timeconsuming; and, (2) the high risk of judicial invalidation of a rule on either procedural or
substantive grounds.”); Paul R. Verkuil, Rulemaking Ossification—A Modest Proposal, 47 ADMIN.
L. REV. 453, 457 (1995) (“Pierce correctly identifies the social costs of rulemaking
ossification . . . .”). But see William S. Jordan, III, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and
Capricious Review Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals Through
Informal Rulemaking?, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 393, 444–45 (2000) (“Judicial review under the hard
look doctrine is the price we pay for delegating highly complex important public policy decisions to
unelected administrative agencies. The ossification critique has long suggested that the price is too
high . . . . This research suggests otherwise.”); Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification:
Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75
TEX. L. REV. 483, 523 (1997) (“Critics of hard look review are on solid ground in concluding that
aggressive judicial review of agency reasoning has contributed to ossification of the rulemaking
process. Their assertion, however, that merely easing the standard of review will deossify this
process is more tenuous.”).
286. See, e.g., Am. Radio Relay League, Inc. v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 248 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part)
(remarking that State Farm has “gradually transformed rulemaking—whether regulatory or
deregulatory rulemaking—from the simple and speedy practice contemplated by the APA into a
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be viewed like a suspect classification that triggers intermediate
scrutiny,287 agency rulemaking would probably become even more
ossified as agencies would not even be able to argue that arbitrary and
capricious review is “narrow.”288 Yet the primary reason Congress
delegates authority to agencies is to increase government efficiency and
adaptability.289 Plus, if agencies cannot plausibly engage in informal
rulemaking, this will result in the unintended consequence of forcing
agencies to use even less formal (and less transparent) methods of
regulation. In fact, the recent spike in Chevron Step Zero cases
addressing these less formal methods is probably a direct result of the
ossification of informal rulemaking.290 This ossification would continue
under intermediate scrutiny review of agency rulemaking because that
standard implies that courts could quite plausibly strike down a
significant amount of agency rulemaking. In contrast, rational basis with
bite would uphold most rules.
The second major advantage of adopting the rational basis with bite
approach for reviewing agency rulemaking is that it accommodates the
Supreme Court’s APA arbitrary and capricious review precedents
amazingly well.291 Only in the past few decades have courts and
commentators recognized that rational basis with bite was a different
form of rational basis review than minimum rationality review.292 But
before anyone had a label for rational basis with bite, Chenery implicitly
implemented this doctrine in reviewing agency action—just one year
after the APA was enacted.293 Chenery held that a court had to review
the actual purposes “invoked by the agency” instead of “substituting
what it considers to be a more adequate or proper basis.”294 And the

laborious, seemingly never-ending process”).
287. See supra notes 225–228 and accompanying text.
288. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983);
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
289. See supra notes 52–56 and accompanying text.
290. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
291. Justice O’Connor explained that rational basis with bite doctrine for reviewing legislation is
a “searching” form of judicial review, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment), which parallels Overton Park’s observation that APA arbitrary and
capricious review is “searching,” Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416.
292. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
293. See supra notes 73–77 and accompanying text.
294. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947) (Chenery II); see also Massachusetts v.
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requirement that courts examine the actual purposes instead of
hypothetical purposes is precisely what makes rational basis with bite a
heightened standard compared to minimum rationality review.295
Fox Television explicitly recognized both prongs of the rational basis
with bite standard. As Justice Kennedy’s concurrence confirmed, it is the
“duty of agencies” to provide an explanation that justifies their rules, as
opposed to allowing courts to come up with hypothetical explanations.296
And Justice Scalia’s majority opinion clarified that courts should review
agency rulemaking to determine whether the agency’s rule was
“rational.”297
Furthermore, even Overton Park and most of State Farm can easily
be reconciled with the rational basis with bite approach. The agency in
Overton Park gave no explanation of how the statutory predicates at
issue were met, so the agency had not even tried to invoke a legitimate
statutory purpose.298 Similarly, the agency in State Farm did not give
any explanation for why it was rescinding the requirement that new cars
have airbags or nondetachable automatic seatbelts—alternatives required
under then-existing regulations.299 The agency therefore did not even
attempt to invoke the legitimate statutory purpose of increasing car
safety while accounting for the costs of implementing car safety
features.
Beyond these watershed precedents, other recent Supreme Court
cases also support applying the rational basis with bite approach when
reviewing agency rulemaking. A number of cases before Fox Television
signaled that the Court wanted to retreat from the State Farm dicta
conception of a stringent standard for arbitrary and capricious review.
United States Postal Service v. Gregory described arbitrary and
EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 534 (2007) (“If the scientific uncertainty is so profound that it precludes EPA
from making a reasoned judgment as to whether greenhouse gases contribute to global warming,
EPA must say so.”); Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 143 (1973) (“The explanation may have been
curt, but it surely indicated the determinative reason for the final action taken . . . .” (citing SEC v.
Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943) (Chenery I)).
295. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
296. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. __ (Apr. 28, 2009), 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1823
(2009) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
297. Id. at 1812 (majority opinion).
298. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 408 (1971). See supra notes 77–
79 and accompanying text.
299. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 38–39 (1983).
See supra notes 142–144 and accompanying text.
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capricious review as “extremely narrow.”300 And seven Justices in
Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC limited State Farm’s “more
searching judicial review” to cases that “involved review of an agency’s
‘changing its course.’”301 Even Justice Breyer, the one Justice who did
not sign on to the majority opinion,302 described arbitrary and capricious
review as a form of “‘rational basis’ review.”303
These signals supporting the use of rational basis with bite in arbitrary
and capricious review cases align with the Court’s more general trend of
interpreting the APA as it was understood when Congress enacted it in
1946.304 In 1946, the arbitrary and capricious standard was the
equivalent of the rational basis standard used for reviewing
legislation.305 However, at that time, it was unclear whether the rational
basis standard was the minimum rationality approach that allowed courts
to examine any conceivable purpose that Congress may have had, or the
rational basis with bite approach that limited courts to looking at only
the actual purpose stated by Congress.306 The rational basis with bite
approach to reviewing agency rulemaking may therefore be perfectly in
line with what Congress understood arbitrary and capricious review to
mean in 1946. At the very least, Congress in 1946 did not think of the
arbitrary and capricious standard as a level of review (such as
intermediate scrutiny) that was reserved for suspect classifications.
While all of these precedents support the rational basis with bite
approach for reviewing agency rulemaking, there is only one Supreme
Court precedent—rather, one-third of a precedent—that could support
the case for intermediate scrutiny: State Farm’s 5–4 holding that the
agency acted arbitrarily or capriciously by rejecting the detachable
automatic seatbelt regulation. The debate over detachable automatic
seatbelts boiled down to how much these seatbelts would increase
seatbelt usage, which affected the cost-benefit analysis permitted by the
agency’s statutory delegation.307 Recall that the majority, in an opinion
300. 534 U.S. 1, 7 (2001) (citing Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416). Cf. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43
(arbitrary and capricious review is “narrow”); Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416 (same).
301. 535 U.S. 467, 502 n.20 (2002).
302. Justice O’Connor was recused. Id. at 474.
303. Id. at 562 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
304. See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
305. See supra notes 42–51 and accompanying text.
306. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
307. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 33 (1983)
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by Justice White, determined that the agency invalidly rescinded the
detachable automatic seatbelt regulation because the agency did not
consider the “inertia” favoring seatbelt use based on the fact that “the
passive belt, once reattached, [would] continue to function automatically
unless again disconnected.”308 Justice Rehnquist disagreed in his dissent,
stating that the “agency acknowledged that there would probably be
some increase in belt usage, but concluded that the increase would be
small and not worth the cost of mandatory detachable automatic
belts.”309
The rational basis with bite approach to reviewing agency rulemaking
supports Justice Rehnquist’s position. Cost-benefit analysis was a
legitimate statutory purpose,310 which the agency invoked to justify its
rescission of the detachable seatbelt regulation311—thereby satisfying its
obligation under rational basis with bite and Chenery to explain its
actual purpose.312 The remaining question was whether the agency had
explained how its rescission of the detachable seatbelt regulation was
rationally related to the cost-benefit analysis performed by the agency.313
As Justice Rehnquist’s dissent noted, the agency provided a “rational
connection” between the two314 by explaining that detachable seatbelts
required an affirmative act to use once detached and it was likely that
many people would detach their seatbelt at some point as many people
were not using manual seatbelts.315 That observation is at the very least
reasonable; even if a court could think otherwise, one could see how a
(stating that the statutory delegation directed the agency to “issue motor vehicle safety standards
that ‘shall be practicable, shall meet the need for motor vehicle safety, and shall be stated in
objective terms’” (emphasis added) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1392(a))); see also id. (directing the
agency to consider “whether the proposed standard ‘is reasonable, practicable and appropriate”
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1392(f)(1))).
308. Id. at 54.
309. Id. at 58–59 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
310. See supra note 307 and accompanying text.
311. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 38–39 (positing that the agency concluded that it could no
longer find that detachable seatbelts “would produce significant safety benefits,” so the detachable
seatbelt regulation was “no longer . . . reasonable or practicable in the agency’s view” given the “$1
billion” it would cost to implement the regulation).
312. See supra notes 69, 238 and accompanying text.
313. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
314. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 59 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 146, 168 (1962)).
315. See id. at 54 (majority opinion) (“A detached passive belt does require an affirmative act to
reconnect it . . . .”).
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reasonable agency could look at the human behavior associated with
seatbelts and conclude that people not inclined to use manual seatbelts
would be inclined to detach automatic seatbelts at least once and then
never reattach them.
Justice White’s majority opinion, though, was more in line with an
intermediate scrutiny-type standard that requires the agency rule to be
substantially related to an important statutory purpose.316 First, the State
Farm majority wanted the agency to provide a more direct explanation
of how the rescission of the detachable seatbelt regulation was related to
the agency’s cost-benefit analysis. The five-Justice majority did not
evaluate whether the agency’s explanation was reasonable. Instead, it
second-guessed the expert agency’s conclusion on an empirical matter
by raising the “inertia” point.317 To be sure, Justice White’s argument on
inertia is a plausible view of how people would use detachable automatic
seatbelts, and it may even have been more plausible than the agency’s.
But the agency’s view was within the realm of reason. Consequently, the
State Farm majority implicitly required the agency to explain how its
rule was substantially related—as opposed to merely rationally related—
to its cost-benefit analysis. Second, Justice White stated in dicta that car
safety was a more important statutory purpose than cost-benefit
analysis.318 Thus, even if the agency had accounted for Justice White’s
inertia argument, the State Farm majority may still have invalidated the
rescission of the detachable seatbelt regulation by prioritizing the
statutory purpose of car safety over the statutory purpose of requiring
regulations to be practicable. This, of course, is precisely how courts
could use intermediate scrutiny to strike down large amounts of agency
action.319
This narrow debate in State Farm should not prevent courts from
adopting the rational basis with bite approach for reviewing agency
rulemaking. Most importantly, Fox Television implicitly limited State
Farm,320 and it did not apply the “failed to consider an important aspect”
criterion for invalidating agency action321 that was used in State Farm to
316. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
317. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
318. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 55 (“In reaching its judgment, NHTSA should bear in mind that
Congress intended safety to be the pre-eminent factor under the [Motor Vehicle Safety] Act . . . .”).
319. See supra notes 279–280 and accompanying text.
320. See supra notes 180–184 and accompanying text.
321. See supra notes 193–194 and accompanying text.
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invalidate the rescission of the detachable automatic seatbelt
regulation.322 Indeed, Fox Television confirmed that courts should only
ask whether the agency’s rule was “rational”323—a holding that may
very well contradict and overrule the approach the State Farm majority
opinion used to invalidate the detachable automatic seatbelt
alternatives.324 Plus, State Farm itself was never focused on the contours
of a heightened standard of review for agency rulemaking. The briefing
and argument in State Farm was focused on other issues325—namely, on
whether rescission of a rule was to be reviewed as if the agency had not
acted in the first instance.326 And State Farm split 5–4 on the detachable
automatic seatbelt issue, so the precedential value of this holding is
significantly limited.327
On the other hand, an argument against the rational basis with bite
approach to reviewing agency rulemaking is that this standard is still too
indeterminate and manipulable to prevent judges from politicizing
administrative law.328 Admittedly, rational basis with bite includes
standards that could allow judges to base their judgments on their policy
preferences by equivocating on the term “rational” as the D.C. Circuit
has done.329 Further, various scholars have noted how the three main
tiers of scrutiny (minimum rationality, intermediate scrutiny, and strict
scrutiny) are not applied consistently even in reviewing legislation—
although that is largely due to the Court’s refusal to formally recognize
the rational basis with bite standard.330
322. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
323. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. __ (Apr. 28, 2009), 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1812
(2009).
324. See supra notes 316–319 and accompanying text.
325. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
326. See Fox Television, 129 S. Ct. at 1810 (“[State Farm], which involved the rescission of a
prior regulation, said only that such action requires ‘a reasoned analysis for the change beyond that
which may be required when an agency does not act in the first instance.’” (quoting Motor Vehicle
Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983))).
327. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828–29 (1991) (overruling precedents that
“were decided by the narrowest of margins”).
328. See Cross, supra note 13, at 1327 (“Numerous judges and scholars have sought over the
years to constrain the scope of judicial review or to improve its functioning through a variety of
legal standards. Such proposals, however, merely shuffle the buzz words required of an
interventionist court.”).
329. See supra notes 106–107 and accompanying text.
330. See, e.g., Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 485–90
(2004); Jeffrey M. Shaman, Cracks in the Structure: The Coming Breakdown of the Levels of
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Beyond doctrinal implications, some would object that the rational
basis with bite standard would not give courts adequate latitude to cabin
the discretion of agencies. In other words, rational basis with bite might
uphold too many rules. It is true that rational basis with bite would
uphold a significant amount of agency rules, assuming the agency
provides a short, yet rational explanation to justify the rule. This
concern, though, has to be balanced with the empirical evidence
confirming that when judges are given significant discretion to
invalidate agency action, their policy preferences affect their
decisions.331 Moreover, Congress made the determination in the APA
that judicial review of agency rulemaking should be quite deferential. If
Congress now believes that courts should have more authority to
invalidate agency rulemaking, it can easily amend the APA to provide
for a different standard of judicial review.
Rational basis with bite may not be a perfect standard, but it is still
the best doctrine available for reviewing agency rulemaking under the
APA. The only way to eliminate any chance of judges using their policy
preferences to uphold or invalidate agency rulemaking is to get rid of all
judicial review of agency rulemaking.332 But making agency rulemaking
unreviewable would conflict with Congress’s codification of the
arbitrary and capricious standard in the APA and all of the Supreme
Court’s precedents on reviewing agency action.333 In fact, it would
subject congressional legislation to standards of review more heightened
than those for agency rulemaking, which is completely backwards.334 So
unless Congress repeals the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard of
review altogether, judicial review of agency rulemaking is not going
anywhere. Rational basis with bite is therefore the best approach for
limiting the use of policy preferences by judges when they review
agency rulemaking, while still subjecting agency rulemaking to a
heightened standard of review compared to legislation.

Scrutiny, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 161, 173–77 (1984).
331. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
332. See Cross, supra note 13, at 1328–29 (“An effort to cobble together a deferential system of
judicial review of rulemaking is a fool’s errand. Only clear firebreaks that preclude such review and
that render disobedience obvious can be effective.”).
333. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. __ (Apr. 28, 2009), 129 S. Ct. 1800,
1823 (2009) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“Congress confined
agencies’ discretion and subjected their decisions to judicial review.”).
334. See supra Part I.B.
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Applying Rational Basis with Bite to Recent Court of Appeals
Cases Reviewing Agency Rulemaking

As discussed previously, Fox Television essentially applied the
rational basis with bite standard,335 and the rational basis with bite
standard would have produced a different result in State Farm.336
Besides those examples of how the rational basis with bite standard
would function in reviewing agency rulemaking, this section briefly
applies rational basis with bite to two recent court of appeals cases as
additional examples of how courts could apply this standard in a
manageable way. As documented in the past, “[b]etween one-third and
sixty percent of agency rules that [were] appealed to courts [were]
overturned through application of the hard-look doctrine.”337 The
rational basis with bite doctrine would drastically reduce that figure,
thereby cabining the discretion of judges to use their policy preferences
to invalidate agency rulemaking. For example, in both American Radio
Relay League, Inc. v. FCC338 and Northwest Coalition for Alternatives to
Pesticides (NCAP) v. EPA,339 the majorities invalidated agency rules, but
the rational basis with bite standard would have supported the dissenters’
arguments for upholding the rules.
The D.C. Circuit in American Radio invalidated an FCC rule that
reestablished a preexisting extrapolation factor for estimating
interference caused by regulated technologies including “Broadband
over Power Line” (BPL), which allows internet access simply by
plugging a computer into an electrical outlet.340 That extrapolation factor
determined whether an operator of any communications apparatus could
335. See supra notes 296–297 and accompanying text.
336. See supra notes 310–315 and accompanying text.
337. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Waiting for Vermont Yankee III, IV, and V? A Response to Beermann
and Lawson, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 902, 907 n.35 (2007) (citing Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald
Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Analysis of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE
L.J. 984, 1021–22 (1991); Patricia M. Wald, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit, Keynote Address at the ABA Section of Administrative Law Fall Meeting: The
Contribution of the D.C. Circuit to Administrative Law (Oct. 1987), in 40 ADMIN. L. REV. 507, 528
(1988)).
338. 524 F.3d 227 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
339. 544 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2008).
340. Am. Radio, 524 F.3d at 240–41; see id. at 240 (“The ‘distance extrapolation factor[ ]’ is the
projected rate at which radio frequency strength decreases from a radiation-emitting source, used to
estimate signal decay for Access BPL and resulting interference to radio operators at various
distances from a source without actually measuring such emissions.”).
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get a license to use a regulated technology like BPL, because the FCC
would not issue a license if the technology would cause too much
interference with radio operators.341 A federal agency within the
Department of Commerce provided data supporting the preexisting
extrapolation factor, and one commenter during the rulemaking process
determined that the characteristics of BPL interference also favored
keeping the preexisting extrapolation factor.342 Two other commenters,
though, recommended a lower extrapolation factor.343 The agency
explicitly recognized these different views and decided to retain the
preexisting extrapolation factor given a “lack of conclusive experimental
data.”344 The agency then reconsidered this decision after one
commenter submitted new studies, which supported the use of a lower
extrapolation factor.345 The agency noted these various conflicting views
and stated that they were accounted for in its initial decision; it
concluded that “[n]o new information has been submitted that would
provide a convincing argument for modifying [the preexisting
extrapolation factor] at this time.”346
Citing State Farm, the majority in American Radio held that this was
not a “reasoned explanation” for rejecting the new studies, which
supported the use of a lower extrapolation factor.347 The majority also
noted that the agency’s modeling data was “not based on empirical
evidence derived from testing or scientific observation.”348
Judge Kavanaugh dissented, explaining that the agency “reasonably
stated that the evidence submitted by commenters was conflicting [and]
that the new evidence submitted on reconsideration was not sufficiently

341. Id. at 232.
342. In the Matter of Amendment of Part 15 Regarding New Requirements and Measurement
Guidelines for Access Broadband Over Power Line Systems, 19 F.C.C.R. 21265, 21310 ¶ 109
(2004), cited in Am. Radio, 524 F.3d at 247 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. In the Matter of Amendment of Part 15 Regarding New Requirements and Measurement
Guidelines for Access Broadband Over Power Line Systems, 21 F.C.C.R. 9308, 9317–18 ¶ 26
(2006), cited in Am. Radio, 524 F.3d at 241.
346. Id. at 9318.
347. Am. Radio, 524 F.3d at 241 (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42–43 (1983)).
348. Id. at 240.
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conclusive to require a change.”349 He also posited that a short
explanation can still be reasoned, as “State Farm does not require a word
count.”350
The rational basis with bite standard supports Judge Kavanaugh’s
dissent in American Radio. No one disputed that the agency was acting
in furtherance of its statutory purpose of setting radio interference
standards that are “consistent with the public interest, convenience, and
necessity.”351 The question therefore would be whether the agency
explained how its decision to keep the preexisting extrapolation factor
was rationally related to that purpose. Admittedly, the agency’s
explanation in its reconsideration order hardly addressed the new
studies, but rational basis with bite would not require the agency to
explain every study presented to the agency. Even under State Farm, the
agency is required simply to articulate a “rational connection between
the facts found and the choice made,”352 and the Court will “‘uphold a
decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency’s path may be reasonably
discerned.’”353 Here, the agency’s reasoning was clear: The agency had
already been presented with conflicting studies, the new studies simply
added to this scientific split, and the agency cautiously decided to retain
its long-standing approach given the disputed scientific evidence.
The American Radio majority employed the quasi-procedural hard
look doctrine and erred by using a divide-and-conquer approach that
required the agency to offer a detailed explanation for rejecting each
adverse study.354 Yet the Supreme Court in Baltimore Gas & Electric
Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. had clarified that
reviewing courts should be “most deferential” when an agency is
“making predictions, within its area of special expertise, at the frontiers
of science.”355 And had the agency changed its position by adopting the
349. Id. at 248 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
350. Id.
351. Id. at 231 (majority opinion) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 302a(a) (2006)).
352. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 59 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S.
156, 168 (1962)).
353. Id. at 43 (quoting Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281,
286 (1974)).
354. Cf., e.g., Gulla v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 911, 920 (9th Cir. 2007) (Fernandez, J., dissenting)
(noting that by isolating each piece of evidence through a “divide-and-conquer strategy,” a
reviewing court “can make it seem like [it is] deferring when [it is] not actually doing so”).
355. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983).
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lower extrapolation factor, courts could have criticized the agency under
State Farm because the agency changed its long-standing extrapolation
factor on the basis of disputed evidence. If it is unreasonable for the
agency to explain that it was presented with conflicting studies and
chose to retain its preexisting standard, the agency simply cannot win
and courts will always be able to invalidate agency rulemaking involving
disputed scientific issues. The rational basis with bite approach would
prevent this by requiring only that the agency explain how its rule is
rationally related to a statutory purpose under the agency’s statutory
delegation.
Like American Radio, the Ninth Circuit in Northwest Coalition for
Alternatives to Pesticides (NCAP) v. EPA356 invalidated agency rules357
under State Farm because the agency had not “demonstrate[d] a rational
connection between the factors that the EPA examined and the
conclusions it reached.”358 Under the Food Quality Protection Act
(FQPA), the agency was required to apply a 10x child safety factor (i.e.,
assume that pesticides were ten times more likely to be toxic to infants
and children), unless the agency had “reliable data” to use a different
child safety factor.359 The agency promulgated regulations that set a 3x
child safety factor for acetamiprid and pymetrozine and a 1x child safety
factor for mepiquat.360
The rulemaking record contained multiple documents pertaining to
the original promulgation of these safety factors in 2001 and 2002. The
agency explained that the “toxicology database” for acetamiprid was
complete and a study of the pesticide in animals showed no evidence of
“increased susceptibility,” but the results of a developmental
neurotoxicity study were still pending.361 Likewise, there was a
“complete toxicity database for pymetrozine” and a study in animals
showed “no evidence of increased susceptibility,” but the “FQPA safety
factor was not reduced to one due to the need for a developmental

356. 544 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2008).
357. Id. at 1048.
358. Id. at 1052 (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 43 (1983)).
359. 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(C)(ii)(II) (2006).
360. NCAP, 544 F.3d at 1047.
361. Id. at 1054 n.3 (Ikuta, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Acetamiprid:
Pesticide Tolerance, 67 Fed. Reg. 14,649, 14,655 (Mar. 27, 2002)).
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neurotoxicity study.”362 As for mepiquat, other studies had already
determined that the “risk estimates” for a compound nearly identical to
mepiquat “were below the Agency’s level of concern.”363 The
rulemaking record also included the agency’s published guidance
document for determining FQPA safety factors; this document provided
that the agency could reduce the safety factor to 3x if it had evidence
that the pesticide was not more dangerous to children, but the results of a
key study were missing, which thus created “database deficiencies.”364
The record indicated that this 3x uncertainty factor was generally
accepted by the scientific community.365
Additionally, the record included the agency’s 2005 final order
establishing the regulations, which rejected the objections made by
interested parties to the agency’s decision to reduce the child safety
factors for these three pesticides.366 This final order cited the agency’s
explanation in originally promulgating these safety factors, and it again
noted that the results of the developmental neurotoxicity studies were
pending.367
The NCAP majority invalidated these three pesticide regulations on
the grounds that the 2005 final order was “vague, making it
impossible . . . to determine whether the EPA’s deviations from the 10x
child safety factor . . . were in fact supported by reliable data.”368 Citing
State Farm, the majority stated that “it is entirely unclear why the EPA
chose safety factors of 3x . . . and 1x . . . as opposed to 4x or 5x or 8x or
9x.”369
Judge Ikuta dissented, finding that the agency’s regulations were not
arbitrary because the rulemaking record included much more of an
explanation than simply the agency’s 2005 final order responding to
362. Id. (quoting Pymetrozine: Pesticide Tolerance, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,786, 66,791 (Dec. 27,
2001)).
363. Id. (quoting Mepiquat: Pesticide Tolerance, 67 Fed. Reg. 3113, 3115 (Jan. 23, 2002)).
364. Id. at 1059 (quoting Office of Pesticide Programs, EPA, Determinations of the Appropriate
FQPA Safety Factor(s) in Tolerance Assessment 10 (Feb. 28, 2002)).
365. Id. at 1059 (citing Michael L. Dourson et al., Evolution of Science-Based Uncertainty
Factors in Noncancer Risk Assessment, 24 REG. TOXICOLOGY & PHARMACOLOGY 108 (1996)).
366. Id. at 1047 (majority opinion) (citing Order Denying Objections to Issuances of Tolerances,
70 Fed. Reg. 46,706 (Aug. 10, 2005)).
367. Id. at 1051–52.
368. Id. at 1051.
369. Id. at 1052 (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 43 (1983)).
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objections.370 She quoted the agency’s explanations from 2001 and 2002
when it originally promulgated these regulations,371 and she referred to
the documents supporting the use of a 3x safety factor when the results
of a key study were pending.372 Given “the EPA’s reliance on [the] longestablished and widely accepted protocol” of using a 3x safety factor if
the results of one key study were pending, Judge Ikuta reasoned that the
court should have “defer[red] to the scientific analysis and judgments
made by an agency operating within its area of special expertise.”373
The rational basis with bite standard supports Judge Ikuta’s dissent.
Like American Radio, no one questioned that the agency was acting in
furtherance of its statutory purpose of maintaining child safety.374 So the
dispositive question under rational basis with bite would be whether the
agency explained, in the rulemaking record, how its decision to set lower
child safety standards was rationally related to the purpose of ensuring
child safety. Taken in isolation, the 2005 final order itself may not have
provided such an explanation, but the 2005 final order cited the
explanations given by the agency in 2001 and 2002 when it originally
promulgated these regulations.
In addition, the rest of the rulemaking record easily explains how the
lower child safety factors are rationally related to the agency’s statutory
mandate of lowering the child safety factor below 10x only when it had
“reliable data.” The record stated that the databases of studies for
acetamiprid and pymetrozine were complete except for the
developmental neurotoxicity studies, and that studies in animals did not
show an increased risk.375 The record also stated that the agency chose a
3x factor for these two pesticides given the accepted practice of the
scientific community for situations where the results of just one key
study are pending.376 Finally, the record indicated that studies already
showed no increased risk in children from exposure to a substance
nearly identical to mepiquat. The agency thus had reliable data to reduce
that pesticide’s child safety factor to 1x because there was no database
370. Id. at 1053–56, 1058–60 (Ikuta, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
371. Id. at 1054 n.3.
372. Id. at 1059.
373. Id. at 1059–60 (citing Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Def. Council, Inc., 462
U.S. 87, 103 (1983)).
374. See 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(C)(ii)(II) (2006).
375. See supra notes 361–362 and accompanying text.
376. See supra notes 364–365 and accompanying text.
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deficiency for mepiquat.377 In sum, by examining only the 2005 final
order instead of the entire rulemaking record, the majority invoked State
Farm and ignored the agency’s explanation in other portions of the
record. Those other portions of the record, though, showed a rational
relation between the child safety factor rules and the statutory purpose of
ensuring child safety.
Both American Radio and NCAP show that the rational basis with bite
standard would limit the ability of judges to use their policy preferences
to invalidate agency rulemaking. This approach would also make it
easier to see when judges invalidate agency rules even when the agency
has provided a perfectly reasonable explanation to support its decision.
At the same time, rational basis with bite would establish a uniform twostep inquiry, which would constrain the ability of judges to nitpick
agency records to find some ambiguity that can be squeezed into one of
the State Farm criteria for invalidating agency rules.
CONCLUSION
Unelected judges have become some of our nation’s most powerful
policy wonks. This past year, judges invalidated Bush Administration
regulations on high-profile issues like global warming and the broadcast
of indecent material.378 In the coming years, judges could just as easily
invalidate Obama Administration regulations on issues like stem cell
research, oil drilling, air and water quality standards, or fuel emission
regulations.379
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in FCC v. Fox Television
Stations, Inc. might prevent judges from continuing to use their policy
preferences to invalidate agency rules. But to ensure that judges’ policy
preferences are not ossifying agency rules, courts need to craft a doctrine
for reviewing agency rulemaking that goes beyond setting fact-specific
examples of how courts should conduct APA arbitrary and capricious
review. This doctrine also needs to give appropriate deference to expert
agencies that are charged with setting our nation’s policies. It should
have a theoretical limitation grounded in the precedents for reviewing
legislation, which have been developed over the past century.

377. See supra note 363 and accompanying text.
378. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
379. See supra notes 4–9 and accompanying text.
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This Article proposes the rational basis with bite doctrine because it is
a heightened standard of review that accounts for the differences
between agencies and legislatures. Moreover, rational basis with bite
would effectively prevent judges from using their policy preferences to
invalidate agency rules, and it fits most closely with Supreme Court
precedent on APA arbitrary and capricious review.
Our modern administrative state, which does not fall neatly within
any one of our three branches of government, is still largely a work in
progress.380 Indeed, the fact that twenty-six years passed before the
Supreme Court in Fox Television addressed State Farm’s approach to
APA arbitrary and capricious review is an implicit recognition that
agencies and lower courts needed latitude to experiment with the proper
ways to review agency rulemaking. But as Fox Television confirms, that
experiment has failed. Judges have been pulled into policy debates in
ways that the framers of our Constitution could never have
contemplated.
Fox Television was correct to scrap the paternalistic doctrines that
allow judges to invalidate agency rulemaking by disagreeing with the
substantive policy decisions made by administrative agencies. Getting
rid of State Farm’s dicta and the D.C. Circuit’s hard look doctrine will
allow presidential administrations to respond to the electorate, resulting
in a structure of government more in line with constitutional separation
of powers principles. This, in turn, may end the regulatory battles that
have been waged between presidential administrations of one political
party and judges appointed by the other.

380. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. __ (Apr. 28, 2009), 129 S. Ct. 1800,
1823 (2009) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“The dynamics of
the three branches of Government are well understood as a general matter. But the role and position
of the agency, and the exact locus of its power, present questions that are delicate, subtle, and
complex.”); FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“The rise of
administrative bodies probably has been the most significant legal trend of the last century . . . .
They have become a veritable fourth branch of the Government, which has deranged our threebranch legal theories . . . .”).
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